



## FCO 8/2843

1977 Jan 01 - 1977 Dec 31

### Talks between UK and USA on Indian Ocean

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#### Catalogue Description:

This file concerns US-UK discussions on the Indian Ocean in May 1977. Subjects covered are:

- Affairs in Africa, including Ethiopia where Mengistu Haile Mariam has taken power; Somalia; and the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas [Djibouti], which is on the point of becoming independent from France
- The activities of the Soviet Union across the Indian Ocean
- Arms sales and economic aid to Indian Ocean littoral states
- The Cuban presence in Africa
- The future of the US military base on Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
- The strategic capabilities of India and other powers in the Indian Ocean
- The US Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), based in Jufair in Bahrain; and proposed changes to this in light of Bahrain's objections to the Force's presence
- US Navy deployments in the region, and discussions with Oman concerning the use of Masirah island
- Negotiations with Singapore concerning naval facilities
- Debates around arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, with a US Government paper evaluating the question
- The US and UK position on the creation of an 'Indian Ocean Peace Zone', which was called for by the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean
- Issues of overflight rights for US and UK aircraft carrying military equipment to third countries

1977

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FILE No. *NB* 063/2 (Part )

TITLE: *ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN*

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LAST PAPER

RECEIVED IN  
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15 AUG 1977  
NB 068/2p<sup>c</sup>

15/8

Mr Wilberforce  
PS/Lord Goronwy-Roberts

## UK REPLY TO THE UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN

- A 1. On 14 April the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean renewed its annual invitation to the "great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean" to co-operate in its consultations with a view to convening an Indian Ocean Conference. In previous years we, in company with the US, the USSR and France have declined the Committee's invitation
- B because the resolution establishing the Committee predetermines the outcome of those consultations.
2. The State Department informed us on 20 April that they intended again to decline but to couch their reply in more positive terms than in previous years, making particular reference to President Carter's statement on demilitarisation in the Indian Ocean. The Minister of State minuted at that time: "I should like to see the terms of the US reply, if possible".
3. However, the Americans did not send their reply and, after the first meeting of the US-Soviet Working Group on the Indian Ocean (22-27 April), Ambassador Warnke informed the North Atlantic Council that the US and USSR had agreed to co-ordinate "guidelines" for any communication about the Working Group to the UN Ad Hoc Committee and to third parties. In the event, the "guidelines" did not deal with the Committee's invitation and on 8 July the State Department showed our Washington Embassy the draft of a revised reply to the Ad Hoc Committee. This declined the invitation to participate but offered to inform the Committee "of important developments that may have a bearing on its work and be of interest to its members". We pointed out to US officials that the latter part of this formulation might lead to demands from the Committee or individual members for information on a wide range of

military and related matters which the Americans might find hard to accept and embarrassing to refuse. We indicated that they might do better to limit their offer to developments in the US/USSR Working Group. We also asked if the Russians intended to decline the Committee's invitation.

C 4. The Americans did not reflect our suggestion in their reply to the Committee (19 July) maintaining that their wording sufficiently safeguarded their position. Although they had not shown their reply to the Russians, they thought that the Russians might well follow the US example.

/ 5. Now that the Americans have replied to the Committee's invitation the way is clear for us to act. A copy of our proposed reply is attached, which UKMIS New York will be asked to convey to the Ad Hoc Committee.

6. We have decided against following the US example and offering to supply information to the Committee for the reasons we put to the Americans. We are not, at present, taking part in any discussions on Indian Ocean arms limitation and the only information which would be relevant and of interest to the Committee is of a military nature. For security reasons we would be unable to reveal it. We are conscious that the failure to make any offer, particularly if the Russians make one, could expose us to some criticism. However, this is unlikely to be very serious, particularly as we know that several members of the Committee, including India and Iran, have no real desire to see the Indian Ocean Peace Zone established in the near future.

7. The State Department have been shown a copy of the reply and they, the MOD and Defence Department, EAD, SAD, UND and MED concur.

*D A Burns*

12 August 1977

D A Burns  
Arms Control and Disarmament Department /cc:..

cc:

~~Defence Department~~

EAD

SAD

MED ✓

ACDRU

UND

DS 11 MOD

Registry  
No.

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
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Unclassified.

To:-

HE .....  
Chairman  
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

From  
Mr Richard  
Telephone No. Ext.  
Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence


In his letter of 14 April, the acting Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean invited the United Kingdom to participate in consultations to be held with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean and to cooperate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee.

As you know, we share the desire of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean for some form of arms limitation in the area. We believe, however, that this will depend upon mutually agreed restraint in the region by the United States and the Soviet Union. My government have publicly welcomed the initiative of President Carter, which led to the decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to explore this issue, and are pleased that initial discussions have already been held. We hope that these will result in a successful outcome.

While we shall continue to play our part in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean, you will be aware that our general reservations in connection with the Ad Hoc Committee remain unchanged. Accordingly, we must regretfully decline the Committee's invitation.

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Mr Brown  
ACDD  
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## ARMS LIMITATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

1. You asked for some comments on Mr Colvin's letter to you of 23 May. I attach a minute to me from Mr James about Iranian policy on the Indian Ocean. As far as the Saudis are concerned they probably support Iranian views on the Indian Ocean but would obviously not wish the influence of the Great Powers to be replaced by Iranian influence in the Indian Ocean any more than they would in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia does not of course carry anything like the same military clout as Iran and for this reason her policies are more theoretical than practical. The Saudis' other weapon, and one which is more ready to hand, is money and we have an example of quasi political use of Saudi money in the Seychelles where the Saudi financier, Mr Adnan Khashoggi, has drawn up fairly extensive plans for the development of the island's tourist, industry and communications. Since Mr Khashoggi was closely linked with the recently ousted Premier, Mr Mancham, the future of these projects must now be in doubt. In general, insofar as the Saudis are able to bring their influence to bear in the world outside the Middle East context, this has been in Africa in which they are taking an increasing interest.

2. The smaller Gulf states would probably follow the Saudi line but obviously have considerably less power to influence events. In general the Indian Ocean is an important waterway to carry oil exports from the Gulf but any threat to this particular route is less immediate than say the threat to communications in the Gulf itself and particularly in the Straits of Hormuz.

13 June 1977

R A Kealy  
Middle East Department

*ms/b*

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US-UK Indian Ocean Talks, May 1977

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REGISTRY No 35  
US paper  
26 MAY 1977

Agenda Item VIII(a)

Overflights

Background Paper

C. MED ✓

NENAD

SED

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In general, obtaining overflight/landing clearances for direct access through the Middle East has become severely hampered by three restrictions: Turkish refusal, with very few exceptions, to allow overflight or landing rights for aircraft carrying military equipment destined for third nations; Arab states surrounding Israel do not grant overflight/landing clearance for state aircraft entering or departing Israel; and Egyptian refusal to allow British flights carrying arms for third nations to overfly or land in Egypt. The latter restriction originally applied to US aircraft as well but has recently been lifted as a consequence of improved US/Egyptian relations. If we were not able to overfly Egypt with third nation military equipment, we would be in the same difficult position as the UK finds itself with regard to gaining access through the Middle East.

#### US Flight Operations and Procedures

US military flights through the NEA area is composed of the following categories:

- MAC "channel" flights: DAO negotiates blanket overflight/landing clearances with host nations for regularly scheduled flights on a one to six month basis.

Used for transporting cargo solely used in support of US personnel and projects.

- MAC irregularly scheduled flights: DAO requests individual clearances in accordance with lead in format requirements of overflown/host nations. Used for delivery of military equipment, for VIP travel and for disaster relief and rescue.

- MAC Medical Evacuation flights: DAO negotiates blanket clearances in advance. Used for US personnel, with occasional exception on humanitarian grounds.

- DOD tactical deployments: DAO requests specific clearances from overflown/host nations. Used for demonstrations (Kenyan independence celebration), participation in exercises (MIDLINK), and occasional operational transits (P-3's to Bandar Abbas, Masirah and Nairobi).

#### US Problems

The main problem in the air access issue is in the delivery of military equipment when our aircraft must overfly or land in non-recipient nations. Although the US can, at the present time, obtain air access through the Middle East and African areas, the arrangements are rather fragile, are frequently costly and require a good deal of advance planning. For example, since we may not overfly Turkey when delivering hardware to Iran, we circumnavigate through Egypt and Saudi Arabia which adds 3 1/2 hours to the flight time.

Future deliveries to Kenya may require circumnavigation of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, since we do not overfly Sudan (because of their insistence on inspection of all cargo) and since our deteriorating relationship with Ethiopia will probably deprive us of overflight rights in that country.

With regard to procedural requirements, obtaining the required clearances from nations along the route is complicated by the varying lead time requirements (from 15 to 5 working days) and the amount of information requested (aircraft tail numbers, crew names, detailed cargo lists). The net effect ties up airlift resources and diminishes scheduling flexibility.

#### Soviet Problems

Iran has on occasion denied overflight authorization to the Soviets for certain type flights but in general this has not caused the Soviets any long term problem. There are no other known instances when the Soviets were unable to gain overflight authorization. Indeed, the Soviets appear to have had a rather easy time with overflights including unscheduled fuel stops when adverse weather conditions have created fuel problems for aircraft already airborne. The ease with which the Soviets have obtained overflight authorization reflects in part the non-aligned and left leaning nature of governments in most of the states where they have requested such authorization.

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As long as the Soviets continue to provide assistance to littoral states and to causes with which they are sympathetic, overflight authorizations will probably continue to be forthcoming.

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MB 063/2

Mr L Gelb

Director, Bureau of Politico-Military  
Affairs (PM)

Director, Office of International  
Security Operations (PM/ISO)

Regional Director, Office of  
International Security Affairs,  
Pentagon (OASD/ISA/NESA)

Office of Disarmament and Arms Control  
in the Bureau of Politico-Military  
Affairs (PM/DCA)

Regional Affairs Office, Bureau of  
Near East and South Asian Affairs  
(NEA/RA)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
(ACDA)

National Security Council

Director, Office of East African  
Affairs in the Bureau of African  
Affairs (AF/E)

Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Staff,  
Pentagon

US Navy

Political Adviser, CINCUSNAVEUR

US Embassy

US Embassy

Mr P H Moberly

Assistant Under Secretary, FCO

Assistant Under Secretary, FCO

Assistant Under Secretary, Ministry  
of Defence

Head of Defence Department, FCO

Head of Arms Control and Disarmament  
Department, FCO

Mr P E Rosling

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Mr P E Rosling	Assistant Head of East African Department, FCO
Mr P Yarnold	Assistant Head of Defence Department, FCO
Group Captain H Davidson	Assistant Director of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence
Mr J T Masefield	Planning Staff, FCO
Mr A Ibbott	Assistant Head of Central and Southern Africa Department, FCO
Mr C J Rundle	Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office
Mr J M Mackintosh	Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office
Mr D R Marsh	DS5, Ministry of Defence
Miss J M Bennett	DS11, Ministry of Defence
Mr E Clay	Defence Department, FCO

The following also attended part of the Talks:

Mr R J O'Neill	Head of South Asian Department, FCO
Mr E J Field	Assistant Head of South Asian Department, FCO
Dr M J Harte	Head of DS22, Ministry of Defence
Dr P Towle	Arms Control and Disarmament Department, FCO
Mr D Carter	East African Department, FCO
Mr S D R Brown	Arms Control and Disarmament Department, FCO
Cdr L Hickson	DNOT, Ministry of Defence

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FIRST SESSION: TUESDAY 24 MAY, 10AM-12.45PM

1. Mr Moberly welcomed the American delegation to London, and invited Mr Gelb to explain his approach to the current talks. Mr Gelb said that arms control would be the focus of the present talks in a way that they had not been before. In the past, Britain had urged arms control on a somewhat unwilling United States, whereas the United States was now taking the initiative in this area. President Carter had re-emphasised in his recent speech in Indiana that the American objective in the Indian Ocean was to reach some kind of agreement on restraint and arms control.
2. An American team would be going to Moscow in June for a meeting of the US-Soviet Working Party on the Indian Ocean which was set up as a result of President Carter's initiative: he would welcome British views on what the US should be doing. The American team would also be going to Paris after these consultations with the British for talks with the French on the Indian Ocean. Mr Gelb hoped to discuss later in the session how to deal with them and with the other allies.
3. Mr Gelb noted that throughout the American briefs the question kept arising as to what the Soviet Union was up to in the Indian Ocean. Was their objective primarily to weaken American interests, or were they more concerned with China\* than with the United States?
4. Mr Moberly agreed that the focus of the talks should be arms control, and hoped that the British side would have certain ideas, though some would be familiar from previous exchanges, to put to the Americans. He looked forward to trying to assess with the Americans what the Soviet Union was up to in the Horn of Africa and what their objectives were.

#### Soviet presence

5. Commander Nepier Smith said that the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean was not much changed: in the past 6 months, it had included a large missile ship and 2 submarines. The Americans had no evidence that the Soviet missile facility at Berbera had come into operation to service the former. Soviet ships had spent more time in the Mozambique Channel area, partly no doubt in support of guerilla activity carried out from Mozambique. Soviet aircraft based in Somalia had carried out surveillance of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean: they had overflown the USS Guam in December and had shown keen interest in the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise. The Russians had also conducted hydrographic surveys.
6. Soviet use of their facilities in Somalia had continued at more or less the same rate as hitherto. The new airfield at Berbera was nearly ready for use and the first flight could be expected any day. The fuel facility there was also complete, and a new facility had been constructed to support new surface-to-air (SA-2) missiles which had been deployed around the airfields at Berbera and Hargeisa.

/The

\* Mr Gelb subsequently said privately that he was alone in the US delegation in thinking that China was an important factor in Soviet policy in the Indian Ocean area.

The Russians usually had one ship and two repair ships in port at Berbera and 3 or 4 waiting in the roadsteads. There was no evidence to support the rumours that a submarine base was being constructed in the Giuba Islands.

7. Though there was no difference in the level of Soviet activity in Somalia, there was increasing Somali political dissatisfaction with the Soviet relationship. The principal cause of this was the reported 382 billion rouble deal for the supply of Soviet arms to the Ethiopians, covering the supply of MiG21 aircraft, 150 tanks, artillery and so on. The deal would be larger than the total of Soviet arms deliveries so far to Somalia. Commander Smith thought that it might take a year for the Ethiopians to be trained to operate the more sophisticated items of Soviet equipment, rather less for the tanks and artillery. Since the Ethiopians' present American equipment was likely to become useless within the next 6 months, the Ethiopians were approaching a period of considerable military vulnerability which would persist until their Soviet equipment was delivered and in full operation. The first Soviet advisers and between 15 and 60 Cubans had already arrived to start training the Ethiopians. There had also been reports of the delivery of SA-3 missiles to Ethiopia.

8. Commander Smith noted that in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, deliveries of Soviet equipment had declined and there had been a cooling of relations. The weakening of the Soviet-PDRY relationship probably reflected Saudi assistance to PDRY and encouragement to purchase their arms from non-Soviet sources. In contrast, there had been a marked increase of Soviet activity in Mozambique. Two Soviet warships had made port visits to Maputo and received a warm welcome. Soviet naval vessels had operated in the area of Mozambique and had given support to guerillas operating from there. But there was no evidence to substantiate reports that the Soviet Union were building a base off the Mozambique coast. Soviet advisers and several hundred Cubans were, however, assisting in training the Mozambique armed forces.

9. In Tanzania, the Soviet Union installed a complete air defence and radar system around Dar es Salaam, also covering Zanzibar and Pemba, between late 1976 and early 1977. They had also delivered armoured combat vehicles, which were probably most useful for internal security operations.

10. The Prime Minister of Mauritius had complained about the size of the Soviet Mission in Port Louis and about the channelling of Soviet funds to the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM), and had also threatened to expel Soviet diplomats and to refuse to renew cultural and fishing agreements.

11. The Americans had, at his request, provided the President of Madagascar with advice on the Soviet facilities at Berbera. Although sceptical of US initiatives on the Indian Ocean, the President was interested in them. His government continued to reject Soviet requests for access.

12. In the Seychelles, President Mancham was reported to have expressed concern about the activities of the super-powers in the

/Indian Ocean.

Indian Ocean. Although he was in favour of a zone of peace in the area, he preferred, as a second best, a balance between the Soviet and American presences.

#### Horn of Africa

13. Turning to the Horn of Africa, Mr Moberly said that the recent large-scale Soviet arms deal with Ethiopia suggested a major Soviet effort to develop a position of strength in Ethiopia. The question arose whether they could maintain their position in Somalia while cultivating the Ethiopians, or whether they would ultimately have to choose between one of their two clients. Would they choose the solid advantages of the facilities they had in Somalia or the somewhat uncertain prospect of greater influence in Ethiopia (which had more resources, and perhaps offered more scope for extending Soviet influence in Africa)?

14. Mr Mansfield said that there were 3 elements of potential conflict in the Horn: first, there was the constant interest of Somalia in the Greater Somalia concept - it was very difficult to imagine a Somali leader who could afford not to take action to defend or further that concept; second, in Ethiopia, a loose-knit empire always on the point of disintegration, and subject to increasing strains since the coup; third, the French plan to make Jibuti independent on 27 June heightened the concern of both the Ethiopians (about the security of the vital railway link) and the Somalis (about the danger that an independent Jibuti might throw in its lot with the Ethiopians - although it was perhaps more likely to throw it in with the Somalis).

15. In this unstable situation, the Soviet Union had an opportunity to strengthen their position in both Ethiopia and Somalia without necessarily provoking the other. The next 12-18 months were likely to be a very delicate period: if either Ethiopia or Somalia took any overt step to upset the balance in Jibuti, the other would be likely to respond. Moreover, Ethiopian military vulnerability was likely to be at a maximum during the change over from largely American to Soviet equipment, and the Somalis might calculate that this was their chance to adopt a forward policy in the Ogaden to further the Greater Somalia concept.

16. Mr Moberly commented that Soviet policy in Africa was basically opportunist, as in Angola. The Russians might simply be exploiting ready-made opportunities for intervention in the Horn. But they faced an extremely fragile situation and some very uncertain prospects on which to make their calculations. Mr Whitmore thought that it would be untypical of the Soviet Union's traditional caution and conservatism to take a gamble on developing their relations with Ethiopia which might put their relationship with Somalia at risk. Mr Mansfield thought that the Soviet Union were nonetheless keeping their options open in the Horn of Africa.

17. Commander Smith said that in his view the Russians were not shifting from support of Somalia to support of Ethiopia, but were instead backing both sides in the hope of preserving their own military presence. Mr Post disagreed. The Soviet Union may have

/hoped

hoped to ride both the Somali and Ethiopian horses initially, but they could not now expect to do so. Ethiopia was bigger, better placed for penetration elsewhere in Africa, and had more resources. He thought that the conclusion of the 382 billion roubles arms deal with Ethiopia was an unmistakable sign that the Russians had in fact decided to support Ethiopia at the expense if necessary of their relationship with Somalia. The Somalis could hardly be in any doubt of this: they had been further annoyed when the Russians transferred to Addis Ababa a former senior Soviet Military Adviser in Somalia.\*

18. Mr Whitmore suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union had Somalia so firmly in hand that they had no need to worry about losing their client and could therefore afford to move on to the bigger prize in Ethiopia, calculating that the Somalis could not take the risk of ending their dependence on the Soviet Union. Mr Post commented that there had been a recent report that a number of Somali military commanders from the same clan as President Siad had warned him that he should not give up the Soviet connection lightly.

19. Mr Post said that the Americans had concluded that unless the Somalis could be provided with alternative sources of arms they could not afford to get rid of their relationship with the Soviet Union. The Somali Ambassador in Washington (who was an eternal optimist about the prospects for US-Somali relations) had requested US assistance, and the State Department were now waiting for the American Ambassador in Mogadishu to see President Siad. A number of foreign missions were currently visiting Somalia, including Mr Rowlands, and no doubt the Somali President was telling each a slightly different version of what the Somalis wanted.

20. Mr Gelb asked whether the West should be active diplomatically in the Horn, or whether they should let the Soviet Union attempt the role of peacemaker in the area. Could Western arms supply policy play a role? Mr Mansfield said that what the Somalis wanted was to open additional contacts with the West. Britain wished to respond to this new mood and for that reason Mr Rowlands was now visiting Mogadishu. But the question of arms supplies was a quite different matter. He noted that M Cheysson (the European Community Commissioner for Aid and Development) had been received well recently in Addis Ababa. This might suggest that the Ethiopians were also anxious to keep open their lines to the West.

21. Mr Post noted that the Americans had had extensive consultations with the Saudis who were very concerned to help Jibuti, to assist generally in maintaining the stability of the Horn and to counter Soviet penetration. Mr Mansfield agreed that Saudi money could be important in assisting Jibuti to maintain its independence. He added that the Egyptians had also told Dr Owen of their great concern about the situation in the Horn. In response to Mr Gelb's question, he said that it would be unwise to leave the diplomatic field to the Russians: if Ethiopia went pro-Soviet this would lead to the encirclement of Kenya which was friendly towards the West and with whom we had a close relationship in arms supplies.

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\* Note: It was subsequently explained in the margin of the talks that no other member of the US delegation shared Mr Post's view that the Russians were already committed to Ethiopia.

22. Mr Wilberforce asked if there was any definite evidence that the Saudis had plans to finance Somali purchases of military equipment from Western sources. Cdr Sick replied that the Saudis had suggested to the Americans some years ago that the arms question was the key to weakening the Soviet position in Somalia, but had made no specific offers. Although the idea had not been followed up, the implication remained that if it were agreed that Saudi purchases of Western equipment would achieve the objective of weakening the Soviet position in Somalia, then the Saudis would be prepared to co-operate.

23. Mr Post added that at talks in Jedda in the previous week, the Saudis had said they were prepared to provide the Somalis with the wherewithal for arms purchases from the West. The Saudis had said that the Americans would have to take the lead in approaching the possible Western members of a consortium, who ought to be prepared to offer concessionary terms.

24. Mr Wilberforce asked about US policy in relation to arms sales to the Sudan, following the news of the expulsion of 50 Soviet Advisers from that country. For our part, we were quite relaxed about the relatively few requests we received from the Sudan for arms. Mr Post said that the Saudis were financing Sudanese purchases of 6 C-130 aircraft, and the Administration did not expect Congressional difficulties over their supply. The Sudanese had also expressed interest in armoured personnel carriers, F-5s aircraft, and helicopters. The Americans would like to know why they wanted this equipment. While they would probably agree that Sudan had external and internal security concerns, they questioned whether this equipment was appropriate for their requirements. They would probably think of sending a US mission to assess Sudanese arms requirements as the next stage.

25. Mr Post said that in theory the West could prevent conflict in the Horn by offering arms to Somalia on a scale sufficient to enable them to break with the Russians. In the short term this would lead to a degradation of the Somali military capability while they changed from Soviet to American equipment and methods, and this might increase stability in the area. A more realistic, modest beginning in the military field would be to post Military Attachés to Mogadishu and perhaps to arrange for a visit by a Western naval vessel there. He doubted if the West was in a position to promote a settlement between Ethiopia and Somalia. The Americans were inclined to take a longer look at Kenya: there were certain similarities between Kenya and Ethiopia before the coup, and if there were drastic changes after Kenyatta's death, the West could be in a very difficult position. Mr Mansfield commented that although there were certainly serious defects in Kenya, he did not think a comparison between Kenya and pre-coup Ethiopia was justified.

26. Taking up an American comment, Mr Moberly said he foresaw dangers for the West in trying to back any secessionist party in the Horn. He thought that, although the Soviet Union were already engaged in the area, OAU and other opinion would probably be opposed to outsiders (especially from the West) appearing to intervene in frontier differences in Africa and that it would be best to leave the Africans

/to

to work a solution out for themselves. Cdr Sick agreed that the structure of a regional solution was just about in place and the West should encourage those working for such a solution without becoming too deeply involved.

27. Mr Gelb asked about the future of Jibuti. Mr Moberly said that the French were leaving a force behind, subject to their being invited by the independent government to do so. However, he thought the French would withdraw those forces if there were any risk of them becoming involved in either internal or external security situations. Commander Smith agreed. Mr Post thought that the Jibuti leadership would be conscious that their own self-interest required them to have reasonable relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia. Despite their tribal links, both the Afars and Issas would be unlikely to want to be submerged in either a Greater Ethiopia or a Greater Somalia, respectively. Mr Mansfield agreed that there were some grounds for hope that Jibuti would remain independent. But if the Ethiopians or the Afars put pressure on in favour of closer links between Jibuti and Ethiopia, the Issas could be expected to side with Somalia. Mr Mansfield added that Britain hoped to appoint an Ambassador to Jibuti - probably on a non-resident basis from Sana'a with an honorary consul in Jibuti.

28. Mr Mansfield referred to deep Kenyan suspicions of Somali intentions and to the numbers of armed Somalis that wandered to and fro across the north-east of the country. Mr Post said that the Americans had suggested to the Kenyans that they should assist with further economic development projects in the eastern parts of Kenya in an effort to wean the Somali peoples of the area away from their attraction towards Somalia.

29. Mr Gelb said that the general drift of the discussion was that we could not do much generally in the Horn, but that we should respond to the Somalis' apparent interest in reopening their lines to the West, while at the same time protecting our interests in Sudan and Kenya. A key element in any possible relationship between the West and Somalia would be arms sales. In response to a question from Mr Moberly, Mr Gelb said that the Americans would be prepared to sell some arms but in a very low key. They would not do more than this. Mr Post added that the West had no interest in Somali facilities nor did we wish to be associated with the Greater Somalia concept. Any aid would, therefore, so far as the Americans were concerned, be on a much smaller scale than that presently given by the Soviet Union. Mr Gelb asked whether it was sufficient to give the Somalis only the feeling that they had friends in the outside world. Would it not require more substantial evidence of Western friendship? Commander Smith said that the Somalis must realise that if they broke with the Soviet Union they would very rapidly lose their military capability. Therefore, President Siad was unlikely to take any chances without a firm commitment from an alternative source of supply, and neither the West nor the Saudis were likely to be able to give such an extensive or firm commitment.

30. Mr Post asked whether it might be possible to envisage a deterioration in the Somali-Soviet relationship, stopping short of an actual break, in which the Soviet Union might continue to supply rather less equipment in return for reduced use of their facilities

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in Somalia. Commander Smith said that if the Somalis bought arms elsewhere but did not go wholesale into the Western camp, the Soviet Union might be content to continue a relationship of lesser intensity. Mr Mansfield said that Britain's ability to supply arms to the Somalis was constrained by our interest in keeping the Kenyans happy and by major difficulties about providing arms to any country on concessionary terms. But Britain had a technical assistance programme in Somalia, and although no capital aid was given at present such a programme could be considered; we would be examining the prospects for this after Mr Rowlands' visit.

31. Mr Gelb asked if an economic aid programme could be a useful way of demonstrating interest in Somalia while avoiding the risk of appearing to be associated with the Somalis' territorial ambitions. It was becoming more and more difficult to justify to Congress economic aid for political reasons, and he would like British views on whether there were useful sorts of projects which could provide an economic justification for mounting an aid programme. Mr Mansfield said that Britain would welcome American aid to Somalia although there was a limit to the number of suitable development projects available. Mr Rosling said that there were physical and consular problems in administering even a small aid programme, although Mr Rowlands would be trying to see whether the climate had improved sufficiently to permit an increased, though still modest, level of assistance. We were trying to see if we could help in, for instance, projects associated with sugar development. Arab money was available to assist in Somalia's development, but the difficulty was to identify viable, useful projects. With luck, our present technical assistance budget of £2,300,000 a year might double over the next few years. Mr Post suggested that Soviet advisers in the Economic and Planning Ministries could be an additional obstacle to Western aid programmes.

32. Mr Masefield asked to what extent human rights considerations would be a factor in American policy on arms sales in the Horn of Africa. Mr Gelb said that the United States would draw the line on arms sales to Ethiopia at a very low level. Human rights had influenced their decision not to proceed with their military assistance programme or the resupply of ammunition to Ethiopia. Mr Post added that violation of human rights in Somalia was at an altogether lower level.

33. Mr Masefield said that what we really wanted of Somalia was that she should cease to be pro-Soviet, but not that she should become pro-Western: it should be enough to encourage Somalia to become non-aligned, and to get on with her own development without lurching from East to West. This is what the OAU and the Arabs would like too, and they might be prepared to work for this. But would the Russians accept such a situation? And would the Somalis accept a lower level of arms supplies? Was this something which the Americans could usefully broach in Moscow? Mr Gelb agreed that the idea of Somalia being truly non-aligned was attractive. He did not think it need be an impossible goal.

34. Mr Wilberforce said that there seemed no need for the West to adopt a forward policy in the Horn. Paradoxically, it was contrary to Soviet interest for stability in the region to be upset. Any

/major

*I find this very hard  
to accept*

major disturbance could set their interests at risk in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Since the West could not hope to replace the massive scale of Soviet arms supplies to Somalia, we must depend on Saudi money and Soviet stupidity to set their facilities at Berbera at risk. Admiral Thomas said that the Saudis were trying to use their money in PDRY, Eritrea and Somalia, and we should try to use them to wean the Somalis away from their dependence on the Soviet Union and away also from irredentism. But it was probably a dream to use the Saudis as a means of injecting Western arms into Somalia on a large scale.

35. Mr Moberly pointed out that, world-wide, the Russians gave an enormous quantity of military aid but very little economic assistance, in contrast to the West. If the Russians had an economic aid programme in Somalia, could we offer Western economic assistance rather than possible military assistance? Mr Rosling thought that total Soviet economic assistance to Somalia was probably not large, but that in the post-drought situation, for example, they had selected some good projects which they had handled well. EEC funds were, in principle, fairly substantial, but there was the usual difficulty in identifying projects. He added that the Italians and the Chinese had aid programmes, and that the Saudis and other Arab States also gave important assistance.

36. Mr Moberly suggested that if China were a major factor in Soviet concern about the Horn as a whole, the Russians might place more importance on maintaining their facilities in Somalia in order to exclude possible Chinese naval activity in years to come, than on the possible gains from a forward policy in Ethiopia. In terms purely of Soviet-Chinese rivalry, the present Soviet position in Somalia could be more attractive than a gamble on uncertain advantages from a closer relationship with the Ethiopians. Mr Gelb said that he was still not satisfied as to what the Soviet Union was really up to in the Horn. It was not clear what advantage the Russians saw arising from their facilities in Somalia.

37. Mr Post thought that one element could simply be a desire to reduce Western standing in Africa generally and in Ethiopia in particular. Mr Wilberforce wondered whether one possible source of Soviet concern was the loss of standing they had suffered in the Arab world. This might have led them the more actively to exploit the opportunities presented in the contiguous area of the Horn in order to compensate partially for what they had lost in the Middle East itself.

38. Mr Mackintosh said that the Soviet involvement in Somalia, and the development of their facilities there, were based on constantly operating factors in Soviet foreign policy in terms of competition with the West in general, the United States in particular, and China. The facilities in Somalia were closely associated with the growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and were therefore directly related with a fundamental Soviet interest. In contrast, the current Soviet involvement in Ethiopia was a display of opportunism, from which the Russians could back out, if necessary, without long term damage to their fundamental interests. The Russians would obviously like to gain Ethiopia and keep Somalia.

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But, although Ethiopia would be a bigger prize in itself, in the last resort Somalia was more important to the constantly operating factors in their global policy and could not be dispensed with.

39. Mr Moberly summed up the discussion on the Horn of Africa by noting that the American and British sides agreed that there was a very brittle situation in the area. The Russians had clearly decided to invest substantially in support of Ethiopia, without compromising their position in Somalia if they could. It was possible, although it was perhaps too early to say, that the Soviet Union had already decided to support Ethiopia irrespective of any possible Somali reaction. Meanwhile, the Somalis wished to obtain some reassurance from the West and from the Saudis of their willingness to help; but they remained attached to the concept of Greater Somalia. Jibuti presented a potential flashpoint for conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. There was limited scope for American and British action to avert any conflict; in particular there was little prospect of the West replacing the Soviet Union as the Somalis' arms supplier. The West should be more willing to give economic aid, but the scope for this might also be limited. We should think in terms of getting Somalia to change towards a position of non-alignment rather than of alignment with the West. Mr Rowlands' visit might reveal what the Somalis were hoping from the West. At the same time, the Saudis were perhaps best placed to give aid and military assistance to Somalia, and we should discreetly encourage this. \*

#### The Cuban presence and role in Africa

40. Mr Moberly referred to reports that a number of Cuban military advisers had now arrived in Ethiopia. If the situation in the Horn worsened, it was possible that the Cubans would send not only advisers but combat troops.

41. Commander Smith said that some Cubans were already training the Ethiopian peasant army in preparation for a campaign in Eritrea. The American assessment was that Eritrea would be independent in about a year's time, unless there was a radical improvement in the Ethiopians' military position. The risk of de facto Eritrean independence could cause the Ethiopians to ask for Cuban combat troops. He agreed with Mr Post that the Cuban army was big enough to provide the troops, but noted that there was dissatisfaction in Cuba with the casualties which their forces had already suffered in Africa and thought that the Cubans would be cautious before risking getting tied down in a long drawn out process in both Angola and Eritrea. +, by analogy?

42. Mr Moberly commented that the Cubans would presumably only intervene with the blessing of the Russians. Mr Post said that if the Cubans became involved in Eritrea they would no doubt present this in Africa as assistance in the defence of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia; but the Somalis would be very alarmed. and to Saudis!

43. Mr Gelb said that the Americans had talked to the Cubans and were raising the question of their presence in Africa with them. The Cubans knew that any new ventures in Africa would obstruct the normalisation of relations with the United States, towards which both sides were now moving.

/44.

\* This rivalry is increasingly persistent.

44. Mr Masefield asked whether there were any other proxies who could act on behalf of the Soviet Union. Commander Smith said that neither the Algerians nor the Libyans were likely to do so. A few North Koreans might, but not in numbers sufficient to stabilise the Eritrean situation - which the Americans estimated would require about 2,000 well trained troops.

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SECOND SESSION: TUESDAY, 24 MAY, 3-5.30 PM

Diego Garcia

45. Admiral Thomas explained that the Department of Defense were willing to forego some of the facilities they had planned on Diego Garcia and were interested in constructing others instead, particularly a new 172-man barracks. But in order to avoid an adverse reaction in Congress to evidence that more American service personnel than originally envisaged were to be posted to Diego Garcia, they had decided to drop their revised plans until the review of American policy in the Indian Ocean had been completed. Mr Moberly noted that the US proposal to construct additional accommodation had been put to us and that we could agree in principle. But if, after the review of American policy was complete, the Americans decided to go ahead, we wished to be consulted again. Mr Gelb agreed to this. The Americans already had the money for this in their military construction bill, but they would hold off until they had worked out their policy on arms limitation.

46. Admiral Thomas said that the press visit had been a success: there had been no great interest or hostile reporting. He asked for British views on whether another visit should be arranged, and for our reactions to the proposal that Australian journalists might visit Diego Garcia aboard RAAF reconnaissance flights. Mr Moberly saw no objection to a repeat visit. He was less sure of the wisdom of letting all-comers do the sort of trip arranged for British and American journalists. Clearly there would be no difficulty about the Australians, but any request from, for instance, Indian journalists would require careful consideration. Admiral Thomas agreed. So far as possible further visits by British and American journalists were concerned, Mr Wilberforce commented that there was now no pressure from the British press for a visit. Admiral Thomas added that there was likewise no press demand in the United States.

47. Admiral Thomas asked what procedure the British would like to adopt for handling requests for visits to Diego Garcia by aircraft or ships of third countries. Mr Wilberforce said he thought the procedure was already clear. British posts abroad had instructions to refer enquiries to London, and it would be for the FCO to consult the State Department. He believed the Americans had issued parallel instructions to their posts to tell enquirers to ask the British in the first instance about visits by ships and aircraft to Diego Garcia. There was one exception to the normal procedure for consultation on the State Department-FCO net: having accepted the principle of RAAF use of Diego Garcia, we and the Americans had further agreed to clear individual flights on the service network. Mr Churchill said there appeared to have been some misunderstanding about the procedure for handling Australian requests. Mr Wilberforce suggested we might sort this out with the Australian High Commission in London. Mr Churchill agreed.

/India's strategic

# India's strategic interest in the Indian Ocean

48. Mr Moberly noted with interest the comment in the American paper on this subject that Indian power "falls off very sharply at the 12 mile limit". Commander Smith said that the Indian Navy was the largest and most modern of navies possessed by the littoral states. 60% of its combat ships were under 15 years old, and 80% of them were at constant readiness for sea. The Indians possessed 8 Foxtrot submarines, of which one was on patrol in the Indian Ocean all the time. The Indian navy had 46,000 men and was increasing at the rate of 2,000 per year: the target was for a navy of 80,000 in the 1980s. New naval facilities had been constructed at Cochin and Vishakhapatnam. The Indians possessed a greater capability for underway replenishment than the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. They had a maritime air capability. Under an agreement with the Soviet Union, the Indians would acquire 3 Nanuchka vessels (equipped with SS-2 missiles), 3 Krivaks and 1 cruiser.

49. In 1976, an Indian warship visited a Soviet port (Odessa) for the first time since 1964: the ship concerned was a Leander-class frigate, and the purpose of the visit was to see if Soviet weaponry could be fitted to a Western-designed ship.

50. The Indians were also planning to build bases in the Laccadive Islands and at Port Blair. It was expected that the latter would possess facilities similar to those which the Soviets had built at Berbera. Admiral Gorshkov had visited India in 1976 to seek base rights, in return for the supply of further Soviet equipment (eg nuclear powered warships and further sea-based aircraft): he had been unsuccessful.

51. Commander Smith said that India was by far and away the most significant local Indian Ocean power. Iran, for instance, would be very hard pressed to catch up. *Interest*

52. Mr Churchill asked whether there was any evidence of third country interest in Gan. Mr O'Neill said that the Iranians had been interested but had recently told us that this was no longer the case. Most of the movable and saleable equipment on Gan had now been removed by the Maldivian authorities.

53. Mr O'Neill commented that the view in the American paper on India was very close to our own. We concluded that India aimed to become the dominant littoral power but did not want to take on responsibilities outside her area. Her powerful navy was out of all proportion to any likely enemy within the region. Its size was related not to a possible threat but in order to project India's status in the world: the Indians felt that such a large and important country required a significant fleet. India's interest in the concept of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone was, incidentally, subject to the proviso that any possible Peace Zone should not inhibit Indian deployments in the area.

54. In response to a question, Mr O'Neill said that India was preoccupied by and very suspicious of China. There were signs that under the new Indian Government, Indian policy would place greater emphasis on bilateralism and nationalism and it was possible that India would become more self-assertive.

55. Mr Churchill asked about the possible Indian view of US-Soviet negotiation on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean. Would the Indians want to take part in these discussions? Mr O'Neill expected that the American initiative would be welcome to the Indians in principle. They would, however, probably wait and assess the results of the initial US-Soviet discussions. Mr Breckon commented that the Americans had assumed that India would be sympathetic towards the American initiative since, if they were successful, an agreement would go some way towards achieving the objectives of the proponents of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ).

56. Admiral Thomas said that he disagreed that Indian power ended at the 12-mile limit. Since 1971 India had put a major effort into building up her navy. If the Americans and the Soviets were excluded from the Indian Ocean, no other power in the area could match the Indian Navy. The Indians would be equipped with surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles and they were expected to acquire new ships and reconnaissance capability. This would enable them to project Indian power for many hundreds of miles from their coast. By contrast, although the Pakistani navy was excellent in terms of personnel, its equipment was junk. The Iranians were a very long way behind. Commander Smith commented that the French presence in the Indian Ocean, which was larger than that of the Soviet Union and United States on a daily basis, was in fact the largest permanent naval presence after the Indians'.

57. Mr Padelford noted that the Indian navy was very dependent on the Soviet Union for its equipment, as indeed were the ground and air forces. Therefore any alteration in the Indo-Soviet relationship would have major implications for India's military capability, and this could inhibit the Indians from making any abrupt changes in their relations with the Soviet Union.

At this point Mr Moberly, Mr Gelb and Mr O'Neill left the meeting.

#### Strategic effects of developments in Southern Africa

58. Mr Churchill said that events in Southern Africa were moving so fast, and Anglo-US contacts concerning policy in the area were being handled at such a high level, that the American side had very little to contribute in the forum of these talks.

59. Mr Ibbott agreed that there was little new that could be said: the British brief on this subject covered familiar and agreed ground. The Russians would no doubt exploit whatever opportunities they could, but they were likely to be cautious about undertaking new initiatives for fear of repercussions on their relations with the West.

60. Mr Wilberforce asked about the extent to which the Russians would be interested in establishing permanent facilities for ships and aircraft in Angola and Mozambique. He thought there was no evidence of this so far, although we had yet to see the results of the Soviet Treaty with Mozambique. On the face of it, the Soviet Union

/would

would have a strong interest in obtaining facilities from the points of view of projecting their own power, of posing the threat of interdiction of allied shipping, and of developing a general capability to pose a military threat in Africa. On the other hand, the acquisition of base facilities could damage the Russians' standing in Africa. Mr Post agreed that in the short term the Soviet interest in keeping on good terms with certain independent African leaders might inhibit them from seeking bases. Commander Smith noted that one Soviet TU-95 surveillance aircraft had already used Luanda. Group Captain Davidson suggested that this could establish the precedent for further Soviet use. Commander Smith thought that the Soviet interest in acquiring facilities made sense if they proposed to use them for surveillance or for support operations in a crisis. But it was not sensible for the Russians to look for facilities a long way from home in order to interdict Western shipping in the shipping lanes of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean since these lanes passed much closer to Soviet bases further along the route and could more effectively be threatened from there.

61. Mr Wilberforce said that the Chinese role in Africa seemed slight at present. In the long run, while there might be ideological reasons for Soviet-Chinese rivalry in third countries, at present there was no significant competition from the Chinese which could explain the Russians' forward policy. Mr Breckon agreed. There was little competition in political terms, and even less in terms of naval competition in the Horn of Africa: given the state of the Chinese navy the latter was a very distant possibility.

#### East Africa

62. Mr Wilberforce said that we were already in regular contact with the Americans through other channels on Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. He invited Mr Carter to talk about the Seychelles and Mauritius.

63. Mr Carter said that we were cautiously optimistic about the Seychelles: the coalition was working satisfactorily (although René was still ambitious to be President) and the Seychelles were reasonably prosperous.

64. On the Islands Agreement, Mr Carter said that President Mancham was concerned about its operation. We had made it clear to him that we did not wish to embarrass the Seychelles, but that we attached importance to being consulted about operational visits to the Seychelles by warships and military aircraft of third countries. We had proposed that in addition we should be informed about courtesy visits (on which we would in turn consult the United States) but had said that if, on the basis of experience, the Seychellois wished to suggest changes in the working of the Agreement we would be happy to consider them.

65. Mr Post agreed broadly with the British view of the situation in the Seychelles. He noted that the US were more comfortable with Mancham as President than they would be with René. The Chinese had already established an Embassy and the Russians were soon to follow.

/He

He agreed that we should be flexible in the operation of the Islands Agreement, on which the US would follow the British lead.

66. Mr Churchill expressed interest in any views of the littoral countries on the current US initiative on arms control in the Indian Ocean. Mr Carter said that the Seychelles and Mauritius were likely to be sympathetic, but that Tanzania would probably be suspicious. Mr Wilberforce added that President Carter's initiative and Mr Vance's visit to Moscow appeared to have aroused little interest in the Indian Ocean area. He thought it possible that the initiative had received little attention since it was clearly subordinate to a number of much more important questions between the Americans and the Russians. Mr Yarnold said that the littoral states were probably also too preoccupied with other events in the area (for instance in East Africa, Pakistan, Southern Africa etc) to take much notice of the US initiative.

67. Mr Breckon thought the littoral states viewed the US initiative favourably. There had been a little public discussion in India. Mr Post said that Kenya might have reservations about it. Mr Churchill suggested that the lack of response to the American initiative in the Indian Ocean area tended to confirm the view that public statements made on arms limitation by the littoral states were primarily vehicles for anti-American polemics and did not demonstrate a keen interest in the subject as such. w  
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#### COMIDEASTFOR

68. Mr Churchill said that the Americans were now quite optimistic about reaching agreement on new arrangements for the continuation of COMIDEASTFOR. They were awaiting the Bahraini reaction to their proposals which were:

- (a) to withdraw all except 75 Defense Department personnel and their facilities from Bahrain;
- (b) to reduce the Force's in-port time at Bahrain from more than 6 months per year to 4 months per year;
- (c) to seek port visits of longer duration than normal at other ports, in order to provide the necessary maintenance time for the flagship.

In response to a question, Mr Churchill said that the Americans did not want to give the impression of making a unilateral withdrawal from the Indian Ocean at this stage. It was valuable to them, in the context of their arms limitation initiative, to keep COMIDEASTFOR in being in some form.

#### US Naval Deployments

69. Commander Kinney said that the Americans had, in addition to the 3 planned deployments in 1976, also made 2 other deployments into the Indian Ocean: the USS Ranger had gone into the area in July and the USS Guam in December. The Americans were still talking to the Omanis about the possible use of Masirah.

70. In response to questions from Mr Churchill, Group Captain Davidson said that the Omanis were establishing a flying school on Masirah which would be entirely under their control, although some British instructors would be on the staff.

#### RN Deployments

71. Mr Marsh explained that on average a group of RN ships visited the Indian Ocean every year. The 1976 deployment had been curtailed by the Cod War. The 1977 deployment would require transit of the Suez Canal by a nuclear powered warship. The task group would deploy to the Persian Gulf before taking part in the CENTO Exercise Midlink and would then go to the Far East and return through the Indian Ocean in early 1978. The Indian Navy would be invited to participate in joint exercises. Thereafter the next possible RN deployment to the area would be in 1979.

#### Activities of other nations

72. Commander Smith reviewed the capabilities of the navies of the principal local powers in the Indian Ocean. The Iraqis had 12 OSA guided missile patrol boats. The development of the port at Umm Qasr was going well and the naval element was almost complete. This would reduce Iraqi dependence on Basra which was vulnerable to Iranian intervention. Saudi Arabia had begun rather late to develop a navy, but was now aiming to acquire about 30 patrol boats by the mid-1980s. Port congestion at Jedda was very serious and the average delay was now between 90 and 120 days. To try to reduce this, the Saudis had restricted the age of ships which could be admitted to the port to 18 years or younger.

73. The Iranian navy had undertaken a very impressive development programme. They had 3 guided missile destroyers and various smaller vessels, as well as a naval air arm of helicopters and P-3 aircraft. But Iranian performance was mixed. During their deployment in the Indian Ocean this year, they had performed the basic tasks of seamanship adequately, but had shown that they could not cope with sophisticated tasks such as missile-firing without Western technicians.

#### Overflights

74. Mr Wilberforce said that he was reassured to see from the American paper on this subject (copy attached) that Britain was not alone in its difficulties over military overflights, and that the Americans had encountered similar problems. Group Captain Davidson said that we had also encountered difficulties in getting permission for commercial flights carrying arms to Malawi to overfly countries en route.

75. Mr Churchill said that the difficulties in crossing Turkey in order to deliver arms to Iran had arisen as a result of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The additional fuel consumed in one month by US flights flying to Iran by the alternative, longer route would run a Datsun motor car for 87 million miles. Mr Wilberforce noted that our own difficulties with Turkey had arisen in the particular circumstances of the aftermath of the Entebbe raid, when the Turkish Government were concerned about the possible domestic and external embarrassment which might be caused by their permitting RAF aircraft to deliver arms to Kenya.

6. This episode had caused us to consider whether there was anything we and the Americans could do to make life more difficult for the Russians in respect of overflights. They did not seem to be similarly hampered. The American view seemed to be that the ease with which the Soviets overflow other countries reflected the left-leaning and non-aligned character of their governments. But was there any evidence that the Russians simply overflow without permission if necessary? He would welcome any ideas the Americans might have on how we could assist each other in respect of our own overflights, and on how we might complicate life for the Russians in respect of theirs.

#### Singapore Naval facilities

77. Mr Marsh described the background and the present state of our negotiations with the Singaporeans concerning the terms on which Britain would continue to control and manage two berths and a fuel depot at Singapore. We now appeared to be in a position to conclude a formal Agreement with the Singapore Government. We had also decided to strengthen the British management team in charge of the berths by appointing a Royal Navy Liaison Officer.

78. We also expected to reach final agreement shortly with the Singaporeans on the question of visits by nuclear-powered warships (NPWs) of the Royal Navy. Subject to this, we expected the first NPW to visit Singapore early next year. Our agreement with the Singaporeans on the regime covering RN NPW visits would open the way for the United States to negotiate their own terms with the Singaporeans.

79. Mr Marsh reminded the American side that the Navy-to-Navy Agreement about the terms of payment for US Navy use of the facilities in Singapore would be due for renegotiation shortly. The British side would be looking again at the charges and would be in touch with the Americans on the service net.

#### Diego Garcia

80. In further discussion of a number of minor points concerning Diego Garcia, Mr Marsh reminded the Americans that we had mentioned the case of Mr Hirons (a scientist) twice in previous talks. Mr Hirons had already been to Diego Garcia but wished to go again. Could he travel on a US aircraft? Mr Churchill said that the main problem was money: Mr Hirons would have to pay. Mr Wilberforce said that we did not seek special treatment for him but wondered if other scientists (eg from the Smithsonian Institute) had also sought assistance to go to Diego Garcia. Mr Churchill said that if the Americans received other requests from scientists they would bear Mr Hirons' interest in mind. Apart from transport, they would need to consider the question of accommodation.

81. Mr Whitmore mentioned that the Ministry of Defence proposed to approach the Americans for their agreement to carrying RN personnel on US aircraft to Diego Garcia. This would enable the RAF to cancel their regular scheduled flight. Mr Churchill said this sounded sensible and they would await the British approach.

82. Mr Carter suggested that it might be desirable to carry out surveillance of the other islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in order to check that nothing untoward was going

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on there. Mr Whitmore asked whether American P-3 aircraft could undertake this task, and Mr Wilberforce suggested that it might be done by asking aircraft flying in and out of Diego Garcia to make a point of checking on the other BIOT islands. Commander Smith said it would also be useful for the aircraft to check the Soviet anchorages in the Chagos Archipelago. Commander Sick said that it was not quite so straightforward: it could require one special P-3 aircraft deployment per year to fulfil the task properly.

83. Mr Carter described the background to the Vencatassen case now before a British court. Although the British Government felt that they had a sound case in law, they were concerned that the court would, as in the recent Banaban case, make moral strictures on government policy. Accordingly, it had been considered advisable to think in terms of reaching an out of court settlement for all the Ilois. The FCO had approached the Treasury for authority to seek such a settlement which would involve a substantial sum of money. Approximately 1,000 people in all were concerned. In response to Mr Churchill's question, Mr Carter said that there was no evidence that the Mauritians had released any of the money originally entrusted to them for the resettlement of the islanders. Mr Churchill said that the fate of the Ilois had been a sore point with Congress and he thought that an ex gratia payment of some kind would be helpful.

84. Mr Carter asked whether the US had any particular views about permitting commercial fishing operations in the Chagos area, and on whether the fishery limits around the British Indian Ocean Territory should be extended. Commander Smith noted that this question had security implications. If the fishery limits were extended and we introduced a system of licensing to permit the South Koreans - who had recently expressed interest - to fish in the area we would establish a precedent which would enable us to exclude Soviet fishing other than by licensed ships. But Commander Sick pointed out that, irrespective of any regime for controlling fishing, Soviet trawlers would be able to pass through the waters of the British Indian Ocean Territory without fishing and could therefore still pose a security threat.

#### Arms Limitation

85. Mr Moberly thanked the US for their paper on "Indian Ocean Arms Control", and asked if Mr Gelb would like to amplify it. (A copy of the paper is attached.) Mr Gelb said that the Americans were at present concerned with questions of principle. They wished to discover exactly what they were getting into. There would be no precise formulation of policy on an Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement before the first meeting of the US/USSR Working Group. Present American studies aimed to lay out the complete range of options. Mr Breckon and Mr Twombly would amplify the thinking that had gone into the US paper.

86. Mr Breckon said that the American objective was, as outlined by the President in his speech at South Bend, Indiana on 22 May, to seek an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. In the joint Working Group the Americans wished to explore Soviet willingness to come to some form of agreement. Privately and unofficially Soviet officials had indicated that they might be prepared to discuss Soviet facilities at Berbera. This might indicate that the Soviet Union

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intended to enter these discussions seriously. But the possibility remained that they saw them merely as a propaganda exercise. The Americans were studying the subject in two parts:-

- a. The broad US objectives. These had been considered at a high level but the US had not yet formulated a comprehensive negotiating strategy;
- b. US approach to the Working Group. The first meeting was scheduled for mid-June (provisionally 15 June). The US approach would be exploratory. They would probably raise the elements that could be included in an arms limitation agreement. They would propose definitions of the area to be covered, ways of measuring naval presence, and also raise the question of the definition and possibly the use of military "facilities". The US would express preliminary views but would not put forward any specific measure or adopt a formal position until they had some indication of the Soviet response. US studies had looked at three broad options:
  - i. Demilitarisation, which would probably ban all military activity by the US and USSR except for transit and communications purposes;
  - ii. Various options for the reduction of deployment and limitation of other military activities eg facilities, aircraft, ground forces etc;
  - iii. A freeze at current levels.

87. Mr Breckon emphasised that no decision had been taken about Diego Garcia and the US position towards it had not changed. Present construction work would continue. They were fully aware that if agreement were reached severely to restrict military presence/usage in the area, this could affect Diego Garcia.

88. Mr Twombly said that the US paper looked at several "negotiating elements". These were:-

- a. The area. They would like the southern limit to be 60° South (ie up to the Antarctic Treaty area). In the East they wished to leave out Singapore. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Agaba posed certain difficulties and risked mixing problems of the Indian Ocean with those of the Middle East. But on balance it might be better to include these areas.
- b. Surface ships. The US considered that combat vessels must be included and also naval auxiliaries. (There was a problem when merchant ships were used for naval support purposes.) Additionally some measure of naval presence had to be found. Ideas had been put forward for ship-days or tonnage-days or some combination of the two. Having agreed on a unit of measure, what level of deployment should be agreed upon?
- c. Submarines. There were three possible solutions. They could be left out; included in an agreement and counted against the agreed allowance; or completely banned.

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d. "Facilities". It was necessary to use this word in order to ensure that Soviet use of Berbera could be discussed. There were several ways of measuring the use of such facilities, eg by counting the number of visits and length of stays. Having adopted a system of measure, what should one do next? The simplest solution would be to limit usage by agreeing not to increase it beyond present levels. An attempt to limit usage to particular types of facility would create definitional problems.

e. Land-Based Activities. Here the US wished to limit or prevent the introduction of Soviet strike aircraft into the area; but such a move could be countered by the Russians with an attempt to limit US carrier deployments. Similarly a US attempt to limit ground forces could be countered by a Soviet attempt to limit US amphibious forces.

f. Nuclear Weapons. Because of verification problems they would wish to leave these out of any agreement.

89. Mr Gelb said it was difficult to know how one could begin to trade off positions in such a vast area. He would welcome British thoughts on the following:

a. The timing and the intensity with which the US should approach any discussions;

b. Should only surface ships be considered or should any agreement be expanded to cover military aircraft, intelligence facilities, bases etc?

c. Was there anything worth trading with the Soviet Union for the US presence on Diego Garcia?

#### British Views

90. Mr Moberly thanked the US team for their amplification of their paper. In considering the "intensity with which the US should approach these negotiations", we would emphasise that we welcomed the American initiative and continued to believe that bilateral US/USSR negotiations offered the best prospects. We would wish to be kept informed of points that might be included in an agreement, especially where they touched on British interests. But we would not wish to push the US into a position against its better judgment. Our interests were served by avoiding military competition between the US and USSR and by creating conditions for stability in the Indian Ocean area. The US initiative had put the Soviet Government on the defensive. There was some presentational advantage with the littoral States in the US being seen to negotiate seriously over limitation of forces.

91. We agreed generally with the American analysis in their paper; with the definition of American and Western interests in the area; and with the fact that it was unlikely that any arms control agreement would restrain the Soviet Union from supporting dissident political movements and protégé régimes in Africa. We also agreed about the areas that would pose the greatest problems: ie, verification, comparison of forces, transit (especially of nuclear weapon-carrying /ships/aircraft),

ships/aircraft), communications, the definition of bases and of the area itself. In broader terms there were other points that concerned us. These were:-

- a. An Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement could create a precedent and lead littoral states in other parts of the world, eg the Mediterranean, to press for a similar agreement.
- b. Care should be taken about any trade-off between Diego Garcia and Berbera. One was politically secure while the other was not and thus they were not directly comparable.
- c. It would be necessary to avoid starting a process whereby the Soviet Union could claim global sea parity with the US.
- d. It might be preferable if discussions were limited initially to naval forces.
- e. We would not wish any agreement to restrict military transit rights or invalidate our policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on ships and aircraft.

#### Soviet Motives

92. Mr Moberly said that he would be interested to hear the American assessment of what the Soviet Union expected to get out of these discussions. Mr Gelb replied that President Carter's statements, in particular on "complete demilitarisation", had caught the Soviet Union off balance. The Soviet Union had long enjoyed a propaganda advantage over the Indian Ocean and had not needed to back it up with substantive action. When this subject was raised in Moscow by Mr Vance in March, Mr Gromyko's reply concentrated entirely on Diego Garcia. He could only conceive of Diego Garcia as a base aimed against the Soviet Union. He did not accept that America also had an interest in stability in the Indian Ocean and a right to offset the Soviet presence there. Mr Gromyko stubbornly insisted that at Berbera the Soviets only enjoyed "recreation and water facilities". But Mr Gelb thought that as the Russians got down to consider these questions seriously, they would focus more clearly on the issues involved - including the realisation that overall the Western presence in the Indian Ocean was very extensive. He feared the Russians might counter the US initiative with some all-embracing approach but there were no indications as yet that they would. The present aim for the June meeting of the Working Group was to establish the seriousness of their intentions to negotiate with the Americans.

93. Commander Sick said that in the Indian Ocean the advantage lay with the US. Diego Garcia was secure, Berbera was not. The US had more flexibility than the Soviet Union. Therefore, in those terms there was no reason why the Soviet Union would accept an agreement to maintain forces at present levels. The Russians would try to adjust any agreement in their favour. In the longer term the question was "what were Soviet aims in the area?" He believed the Soviet Union

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wanted to be seen to be a global power; to make "political hay" in Africa particularly in relation to the Chinese who had no military presence in the area; to ensure a free sea route for Soviet trade. On this point, he had calculated that approximately 15% of Soviet trade went through the area, and this equated reasonably closely with the number of days Soviet warships spent in the area as a proportion of their global activity. The Soviet Union had a steady long-term commitment to the area that would not just go away. For the US the primary interest was freedom of access to oil supplies; the other interests, eg in political stability of states in the area, were secondary. US interests in the area would probably peak in the next ten to fifteen years. US forces there were limited and were often drawn from units deployed in the Pacific.

94. Commander Sick believed that there was a parallel with the Mediterranean where initially the Soviet Union had deployed a few "rusty ships". Gradually they had built a fleet comparable in numbers but not fire power to the US 6th Fleet. It was only once the Soviet Union started using air bases and other facilities in Egypt that the US had been forced to take Soviet presence seriously. In the Indian Ocean the Russians were now at the "rusty ship" stage and the real issue was what would happen next. The Americans feared the next step would be the introduction of Soviet strike aircraft into the area. The Russians had paved the way carefully for themselves and Berbera made no sense without such deployment. If it occurred, then it would signify a change in the balance in the area, as the Soviet strike aircraft would be there permanently, whereas the US carrier borne aircraft would only be deployed temporarily. This gave a reason for the Americans to press for agreement covering strike aircraft and military ground forces; but the Soviet Union were unlikely to give away their advantages without similar concessions by the US. He sensed that the US navy were reluctant to "go into arms control". This was no doubt shared by the Soviet navy which had carefully prepared the way for further expansion. The choice appeared to be either to attempt to offset a future Soviet advantage or to rest on present force levels.

95. Mr Moberly said that in essence what the Americans seemed to be saying was that the immediate problem was whether it was worth foregoing periodic carrier deployments in the Indian Ocean in order to prevent the Soviet Union deploying strike aircraft there. Commander Sick agreed that this was a stark way to express the problem.

96. Mr Edmonds asked what kind of Russians the Americans expected to negotiate with. Would they be from the Foreign Ministry? Mr Gelb replied that they would be from the Foreign Ministry but he did not at present know their names. He hoped they would be "friendly".

/Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ)

Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ)

97. Mr Moberly asked how the concept of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) fitted into current American thinking on the Indian Ocean. Mr Gelb replied that the US did not want to get into this as it was aimed against the US and not the Soviet Union.

98. Mr Edmonds commented that when considering arms control in the Indian Ocean it was necessary to ask "who are we trying to impress?" Presumably both the US and USSR wished to impress the UN as a whole, the non-aligned in particular, and the Indian Ocean states, with their desire to avoid competition in the area. But both sides would presumably also try to convince their friends in the area that they were not leaving them to the mercy of the "other power" or the more powerful states in the area. Asked about Soviet objectives, he said he thought they were a mirror image of the Americans'. They would try to obtain a propaganda advantage in the eyes of the non-aligned and less publicly they would want to assure their client states that the US would not gain any advantage. In this connection, he asked how the US intended to deal with the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the IOPZ concept. It would not conveniently disappear while the US/USSR discussed the question bilaterally. The UK needed to know how the US would deal with the Indian Ocean Committee. Perhaps the best answer was for the US and UK to say that they considered the prospect of US/USSR talks on the Indian Ocean to be the most realistic approach and that in the interim they saw no advantage in participating in the Committee's work.

99. Mr Breckon emphasised the clear distinction made between the approach to the Soviet Union and IOPZ. It was possible at some remote future date that some connection might be made between a bilateral agreement worked out with the Soviet Union and the IOPZ. He hoped that the US would have answered the Ad Hoc Committee's request before the first meeting of the US/Soviet Working Group on this subject.

100. Mr Gelb confirmed that the Americans would look at this problem and inform the British once they had decided on how to reply. Mr Churchill stressed that the US intended to support their friends in the area. He believed that several of the littoral states had criticised the US presence at Diego Garcia, secure in the knowledge that the US were unlikely to leave it. This was an irresponsible attitude and if serious discussions began with the Russians, these littoral states might have to declare themselves.

Congressional Interest

101. Mr Moberly asked what degree of interest was shown by Congress in this subject at the moment. Mr Gelb replied that this centred mainly around Senator Culver who had tried to get the Administration to think deeply about avoiding an arms race in the Indian Ocean. If either side started to increase its naval deployment it could, in the present climate, develop into a highly competitive situation. To

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prevent this the US wished to "cap it". The Administration were on the same wavelength as Congress and were serious about pursuing President Carter's idea for a real arms limitation agreement, but the problems were substantive.

#### Types of Arms Limitation Agreement

102. Mr Moberly hoped that any arrangement made by the Americans would try to reduce the possibility of confrontation and to "cap" the present situation. This would probably be a more realistic aim than the negotiation of actual reductions.

103. Mr Wilberforce asked whether the Americans thought it possible that an Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement would give them some form of leverage with problems in Southern Africa. A general formula covering US and Soviet conduct, based on mutual restraint and the avoidance of confrontation might be preferable to a detailed agreement on naval limitations. This approach could have the advantage of providing a basis on which the US and USSR could hope to manage regional problems, particularly in Southern Africa. If it were possible to reach a general political agreement this could be supported by a few selected provisions covering such matters as perhaps a freeze on permanent naval force levels, or prior notification of major naval deployments, and an agreement not to deploy strike aircraft or ground combat forces. It might be possible to provide for consultation, in a way which would give the Americans some handle over Soviet intervention in the affairs of the littoral states. Given the extent of public concern about Soviet (and Cuban) intervention in Africa, especially Southern Africa, an Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement might be attacked as irrelevant (as it would have been at the time of the Angola crisis), if it did not extend the area of mutual restraint in this way. Mr Wilberforce thought that Mr Gelb would find the French particularly interested in this point of curbing destabilising interventions in Africa. In some ways the less specific the document the better, particularly given the changing character of naval deployment.

104. Mr Edmonds supported Mr Wilberforce's view that a general agreement was preferable. A formal arms control agreement in the Indian Ocean would be without precedent. It would be difficult to negotiate and it could lead to demands, particularly by Mediterranean states, for a similar agreement.

105. Mr Gelb, referring to Mr Wilberforce's remarks about the effect of the Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement on policies in Africa, wondered if the problems in Africa and the Middle East were not so great that they would make an Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement itself impossible if it attempted to cover them. He did not think it would be possible to solve the conflict in Southern Africa through the back door. The Soviet Union was unlikely to do anything in the Indian Ocean context that would inhibit its African policy.

106. Mr Gelb said the question of setting a precedent had been raised by the French, but he considered it to be a "red herring". He believed the Indian Ocean was like SALT and the Mediterranean like MBFR.

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The Indian Ocean was a subject for bilateral discussions with the Russians on which the Americans would keep their allies closely informed, whereas discussions on the Mediterranean would have to involve the Allies. The Americans were under no pressure from within the US to embark on Mediterranean talks. Mr Edmonds explained that he was not worried about internal pressure in the US demanding an extension of an Indian Ocean agreement to the Mediterranean. But what of the Mediterranean littorals themselves? Pressure from them would not necessarily be serious but could become tiresome in the next 5 to 10 years.

107. Mr Marsh said that from the RN point of view he believed there would be a preference for a general restraint on increases in deployments rather than a detailed agreement reducing the US & Soviet presences. This would be less likely to stimulate pressures to reduce RN deployments to the Indian Ocean or to create a worrying precedent for other areas such as the Mediterranean and the Baltic.

108. Group-Captain Davidson added that a bilateral agreement would have less impact on the RN but it would be necessary to look carefully at the side effects that it might have, particularly on CENTO. Mr Breckon wondered what form a declaration on restraint would take. A declaration without a prior understanding on data could be a source of recrimination rather than stability.

#### Definition of the Area

109. Mr Edmonds pointed out that in discussion with the Americans a year ago, it had been considered that the area should be defined with a Southern limit at 50° south and the Eastern limit at 120° east. We should also consider leaving out the Red Sea. The result would be an area that was easier to verify. Cdr Sick replied that the omission of areas such as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf would create a problem of "sanctuaries". If it were decided not to include the Red Sea and if the Soviet Union were able to establish bases in Ethiopia, then they could position naval forces just outside the Indian Ocean but with ready access to the part of it that most concerned the US. He considered it would present no problems if the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba were included in the agreement. But it might be necessary to make special arrangements for countries with which the US had military connections or which faced two different seas, by excluding certain types of military deployments. Otherwise the landing of US aircraft in Iran or Egypt might be a breach.

110. Mr Moberly said that instinctively one would argue to omit the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba on the ground that the problem was already complicated enough as it stood, although he fully accepted the point about "sanctuaries". He also foresaw serious difficulties in trying to formulate exceptions for a long list of US allies such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Thailand without impairing the value of any agreement.

#### Concluding Remarks

111. Mr Moberly concluded by saying that he was confident that the United States would keep us closely informed. We particularly valued

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close consultation on anything affecting Diego Garcia. We were prepared to trust their judgement on what the best form of agreement would be. But the Americans might wish to reflect upon the possibility of some general provisions for mutual restraint, although we could hardly expect Indian Ocean arrangements to solve the problems of Southern Africa. It was probably best to enter the discussions with the Russians with an open mind; after the initial contact the situation could become clearer and it might be possible to see the Russian price for an arms limitation agreement.

112. Mr Gelb emphasised the priority placed by the Administration on consultations with European allies. They were concerned to ensure that tensions existing between them and the Soviet Union did not spill over into the Indian Ocean. US proposals on the Indian Ocean were being put forward seriously and not as a propaganda exercise. The approach was non-doctrinaire and pragmatic, and these discussions had been of value in contributing to thorough preparation before meeting the Russians.

#### Naval Control of Shipping

113. After the conclusion of the main talks, the following attended a short session to discuss Naval Control of Shipping matters:

Mr P Yarnold  
Mr D R Marsh  
Cdr. L Hickson  
Mr E Clay

Mr G T Churchill  
Commander H Kinney

114. Mr Marsh recalled that at the last session of talks in Washington, there had been discussion of the responsibility for regional co-ordination of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) arrangements in the Middle East area. Britain was the "regional co-ordinator" for Area Bravo (Southern Africa) and the Middle East Area and we should accordingly be planning for Naval Control of Shipping should the need arise. However, the Royal Navy now had no permanent forces in the area, nor the staff, communications or other facilities in the littoral countries to support NCS planning. We had heard that the US Navy might be thinking of offering to take over as regional co-ordinator in the Middle East and would be interested to know if this was correct.

115. Mr Churchill said that he thought that NCS was a NATO task and the arrangements could not be altered bilaterally. Mr Marsh said that ultimately this was probably correct. Our NCS responsibilities were indeed laid on us by NATO, but we would not want to inform NATO that we could no longer perform the task without first establishing American willingness and ability to take it over from us. No other NATO partner could do so. If the US could not take over this responsibility, Britain would probably continue with it on the present dormant basis, which would mean that the NCS organisation was less

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effective than in the main NATO area or in the Pacific. Mr Yarnold pointed out that NCS was not entirely a NATO subject and that, for instance, the Australians were also involved in the world-wide NCS organisation. He thought that if the British and Americans agreed that the US Navy should take over the co-ordinating responsibility in the Middle East, NATO would accept this.

116. Commander Kinney said that the only US facility in the area capable of taking on the task was COMIDEASTFOR. Its future was somewhat unclear: even if the Americans reached a satisfactory arrangement with the Bahrainis, it was also possible that American negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control in the Indian Ocean could affect the Force's future. The US Navy were therefore not prepared to take on the co-ordinating role at present, but would be prepared to begin Navy-to-Navy discussions with us about the problems.

117. Mr Yarnold raised the more general question of policy concerning NCS exercises conducted under the Radford-Collins agreement, which involved the Americans, the British, the Canadians and the Australians. In the last exercise of this kind (Exercise Roller Coaster) the initial plans provided for the inclusion of the Middle East. In the end these were cancelled on grounds of practicability, but not before we had made certain arrangements which revealed considerable political difficulties about the activation of NCS officers in the area, especially in Karachi. We had in the process also discovered that some American posts had not been aware of the Exercise and had raised similar questions to our own about potential embarrassment if the local authorities became aware that NCS exercises were taking place in their territory. We would welcome American views on policy for future exercises from the diplomatic point of view.

118. Commander Kinney said that the US Navy had been surprised to hear that NCS exercises raised political problems, since they were intended as a purely internal affair. Their practice was to activate NCS officers in third countries where there was a resident US Naval Attaché or a US Consular official who would take on the job so that no reinforcement from outside was necessary. It was not the practice to activate the real NCS officers who would, in a crisis, become responsible at these posts. Mr Yarnold noted the difference between RN and USN practice, in that we required the designated NCS officers physically to move into the posts they would occupy in a crisis for exercise purposes. Commander Kinney handed over to the British side a copy of a US Navy-State Department memorandum on Naval Control of Shipping.

119. Mr Churchill noted that the Department of Defense was required to clear with the State Department both sensitive exercises or exercises in sensitive areas before these were mounted. In the case of Exercise Roller Coaster, doubts about the political sensitivity of the exercise had been heightened by the fact that few in the State Department understood the purposes of NCS or were aware that such exercises had been conducted in the past. Mr Yarnold said that the British side was working on a draft circular letter to all posts to inform them of the purposes of NCS and to prepare the ground for the time when we might

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need posts' co-operation for future specific exercises involving them.

120. Mr Marsh added that an additional complication in the case of Exercise Roller Coaster had been the organisers' intention to issue a press release about it. There was a risk that this would draw attention to the fact that the exercise was taking place in third countries. Commander Kinney said he thought it better not to disclose the fact that the exercise was taking place abroad. Commander Hickson said that the level of involvement in an exercise of any particular officer or diplomatic post could be tailored according to local requirements and sensitivities. It need not involve the local authorities at all. So far as the press announcement to which Mr Marsh had referred was concerned, it was considered necessary to issue one on this occasion in case the extensive call up of reservists in the United States for the exercise led to enquiries which, in the absence of proper guidance, could have led the media to suspect that something more sinister was afoot. No press release had been issued in Britain where the numbers of RN Reserve officers concerned was much smaller. He thought it would be possible to meet everyone's requirements by issuing a press release about the exercise insofar as it involved the NCS organisation in North America and Australia, but avoiding disclosure of the activation of NCS posts in third countries. The next exercise was proposed for April 1978 and, subject to American agreement, it was planned to hold one every 2 years thereafter. It was not yet known which areas would be covered in the next exercise.

#### Future Talks

121. The question of the future frequency of Anglo-US consultations on the Indian Ocean was discussed outside the main talks. Mr Gelb suggested a relaxation of the regular six-monthly cycle, proposing that meetings should be held as and when either side considered there was something new to talk about. Mr Moberly accepted this, subject to the interval between talks being no more than one year. Either side could approach the other at any time, but we would in any case expect to meet not later than May 1978. This was agreed.

#### Briefing of Australians and New Zealanders

122. During and after the talks, both sides agreed that the British should brief the Australians and the New Zealanders on the British view of subjects raised during this round of the Indian Ocean talks, and that the Americans would brief representatives of the Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington on their own views on the subjects discussed, in particular the US initiative on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean. (Mr Wilberforce accordingly briefed the two High Commissions in London on 30 May).

## US-UK Indian Ocean Talks, May 1977

US paper

## Agenda Item VIII(a)

## Overflights

Background Paper

In general, obtaining overflight/landing clearances for direct access through the Middle East has become severely hampered by three restrictions: Turkish refusal, with very few exceptions, to allow overflight or landing rights for aircraft carrying military equipment destined for third nations; Arab states surrounding Israel do not grant overflight/landing clearance for state aircraft entering or departing Israel; and Egyptian refusal to allow British flights carrying arms for third nations to overfly or land in Egypt. The latter restriction originally applied to US aircraft as well but has recently been lifted as a consequence of improved US/Egyptian relations. If we were not able to overfly Egypt with third nation military equipment, we would be in the same difficult position as the UK finds itself with regard to gaining access through the Middle East.

US Flight Operations and Procedures

US military flights through the NEA area is composed of the following categories:

- MAC "channel" flights: DAO negotiates blanket overflight/landing clearances with host nations for regularly scheduled flights on a one to six month basis.

Used for transporting cargo solely used in support of US personnel and projects.

- MAC irregularly scheduled flights: DAO requests individual clearances in accordance with lead time and format requirements of overflown/host nations. Used for delivery of military equipment, for VIP travel and for disaster relief and rescue.

- MAC Medical Evacuation flights: DAO negotiates blanket clearances in advance. Used for US personnel, with occasional exception on humanitarian grounds.

- DOD tactical deployments: DAO requests specific clearances from overflown/host nations. Used for demonstrations (Kenyan independence celebration), participation in exercises (MIDLINK), and occasional operational transits (P-3's to Bandar Abbas, Masirah and Nairobi).

#### US Problems

The main problem in the air access issue is in the delivery of military equipment when our aircraft must overfly or land in non-recipient nations. Although the US can, at the present time, obtain air access through the Middle East and African areas, the arrangements are rather fragile, are frequently costly and require a good deal of advance planning. For example, since we may not overfly Turkey when delivering hardware to Iran, we circumnavigate through Egypt and Saudi Arabia which adds 3 1/2 hours to the flight time.

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Future deliveries to Kenya may require circumnavigation of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, since we do not overfly Sudan (because of their insistence on inspection of all cargo) and since our deteriorating relationship with Ethiopia will probably deprive us of overflight rights in that country.

With regard to procedural requirements, obtaining the required clearances from nations along the route is complicated by the varying lead time requirements (from 15 to 5 working days) and the amount of information requested (aircraft tail numbers, crew names, detailed cargo lists). The net effect ties up airlift resources and diminishes scheduling flexibility.

#### Soviet Problems

Iran has on occasion denied overflight authorization to the Soviets for certain type flights but in general this has not caused the Soviets any long term problem. There are no other known instances when the Soviets were unable to gain overflight authorization. Indeed, the Soviets appear to have had a rather easy time with overflights including unscheduled fuel stops when adverse weather conditions have created fuel problems for aircraft already airborne. The ease with which the Soviets have obtained overflight authorization reflects in part the non-aligned and left leaning nature of governments in most of the states where they have requested such authorization.

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As long as the Soviets continue to provide assistance to littoral states and to causes with which they are sympathetic, overflight authorizations will probably continue to be forthcoming.

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US papers.

## US-UK Indian Ocean Talks - May 1977

## Agenda Item VI

## Indian Ocean Arms Control

Background PaperA. The Setting

Since 1949, the US has maintained a limited military presence in the Indian Ocean area in the form of a flagship and two destroyers of Middle East Force stationed at Bahrain. Although a policy of increased naval deployments was announced in 1964, it was never fully implemented due to the military requirements and pressures of Vietnam.

The establishment of a naval facility on Diego Garcia was proposed in the late 1960's but was defeated by Congress in 1969. A scaled-down version consisting primarily of a communications station and a 8,000-foot supporting airfield was approved by Congress in 1971, and became operational in early 1973.

Soviet military activity in the Indian Ocean began in 1968 and increased to the extent that by 1974 they regularly deployed about 19 ships on a daily basis, eight or nine of which were combat vessels. Their force presence has since stabilized at somewhat reduced levels, but Soviet capabilities have increased as a result of the expansion of support facilities at Berbera, and the recent addition of maritime air patrols operating from airfields in Somalia. Soviet-built facilities at Berbera include a communications station, port and fuel storage facilities, an airfield large enough to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, and a cruise missile storage and handling facility. The growth of Soviet facilities was tied to a large scale military assistance program, and the continuation of the Soviet presence remains dependent on the state of Soviet-Somali relations, which are currently under strain.

In October 1973, the United States announced a "return to a policy of more frequent and more regular" US naval deployments to the Indian Ocean, following the partial Arab

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blockade of the Red Sea during the Arab-Israel war and in view of the Soviet military buildup in the area. Since that time, we have deployed an average of three or four task groups each year into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Fleet, in addition to the three ships of Middle East Force which remain in the area on a permanent basis.

This change of policy was accompanied by a request for the expansion of naval facilities on Diego Garcia. Despite prolonged Congressional opposition, the Diego Garcia expansion program was finally approved in July 1975, and construction work has been going on since the spring of 1976.

The principal facilities currently in existence or planned for Diego Garcia include a 12,000-foot runway, petroleum storage facilities, a dredged basin within the lagoon large enough to accommodate a carrier task group, a deep-water pier for loading and off-loading oil and other supplies, a naval communications station, billeting for about 800 personnel, limited storage facilities and miscellaneous associated construction for a total of about \$40 million worth of new construction.

#### B. Current Attitudes Toward Arms Control

The possibility of arms limitations in the area has been discussed since 1970, when Sri Lanka initiated a proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. This proposal has been discussed in the UN General Assembly every year since that time, and an ad hoc committee composed of Indian Ocean littoral states has been established to deal with this issue. The objection of most maritime nations (including the US and USSR) to the Peace Zone proposal is its implication that littoral nations have the right to impose restrictions on the use of adjacent waters, contrary to customary international laws on freedom of use of the high seas.

Neither the US nor the Soviet Union has taken an actively positive attitude towards Indian Ocean arms control. In 1971 the Soviets asked if we would be interested in a joint declaration on arms restraint. We replied that we agreed in principle and asked for more elaboration of Soviet views. Moscow never responded and there have not been any other direct bilateral exchanges until the current US initiative.

Recently the Soviets have adopted a new public approach to the Peace Zone issue. This was indicated in Brezhnev's speech to the 25th Party Congress in February 1976, and in Gromyko's address to the UN General Assembly last fall.

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Moscow views with understanding the desire of the littoral nations to establish a Peace Zone in the area; however, in the Soviet view the first step should be the dismantling of foreign military bases in the region (and the Soviets deny that they have any bases in the area). Moscow would then be willing to discuss a reduction in the military activities of non-littoral nations. The Soviet response to our March 1977 approach in Moscow gave no indication of movement beyond their public position.

Based on Soviet statements to date, it appears that the USSR might prevent serious discussion of Indian Ocean arms limitations by demanding the elimination of US "bases" such as Diego Garcia, Masirah and Northwest Cape, while insisting that the Berbera facility belongs to Somalia and is therefore not in the same category. They might also insist that the talks be broadened to include some or all of the littoral states, or they might insist that any agreement insure military "parity" between their own forces on the one hand and the combined forces of the US and its allies on the other. In short, if the Soviet Union chose to exploit the discussions solely for propaganda purposes, there will be opportunities to do so.

On the other hand, the Soviets might consider that their long-term interests would be served by negotiating seriously. In informal and unofficial conversations, various Soviets have indicated that discussions could include their use of support facilities at Berbera. The Soviets may be interested in limiting naval competition in the belief that the advantages of such a competition might accrue to the US. They may be unsure of their position in Somalia, which is subject to political changes, and may see advantages in trying to negotiate limitations on US facilities at Diego Garcia, on deployments on aircraft carriers and amphibious forces and a ban on the deployment of SSBN's in the Indian Ocean. They have also been put on the propaganda defensive by President Carter's stated goal of Indian Ocean demilitarization and may come to feel compelled to demonstrate more specifically than in the past their commitment to forestalling big power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

Although the Soviets regularly have more ships in the Indian Ocean than we do, they cannot match the firepower of a US carrier task group when deployed to the area (currently only once a year). The limited underway replenishment

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capability of the Soviet fleet limits its capacity for sustained combat, and the lengthy deployment periods of their ships make access to ports such as Berbera attractive as a convenient location for resupply and repair. The heavy reliance of the Soviet Navy on shore facilities, especially for air support, makes the evolution of their political relations with Somalia particularly significant.

With the Suez Canal open, the Soviet Union enjoys a marginal advantage in surge capability since their relatively large fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean could deploy to the Arabian Sea in less than five days, while the US could not match them in numbers or firepower since US attack carriers today cannot pass through the Canal. The United States can deploy a carrier task group from the Pacific Fleet to the Arabian Sea in about 12 days, approximately ten days before Soviet units could arrive from their Pacific bases. British and French forces would require two to three weeks to deploy forces to the Indian Ocean with the Canal open, or more than a month if it were closed.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has stationed ground combat forces in countries on the Indian Ocean littoral, and neither has military aircraft permanently stationed in the area. The USSR has conducted occasional TU-95 surveillance flights into the area from bases in the southern USSR, overflying Iran. In addition, since April 1975 the USSR has begun sending IL-38 surveillance aircraft to Somalia with increasing frequency (44 deployment days in 1975, 103 in 1976, and 118 in the first four months of 1977). The United States, in addition to carrier deployments, has conducted regular surveillance flights by P-3 aircraft out of Diego Garcia and Iran, with occasional stops at Masirah Island and other regional airfields. In the past, US sortie rates have been far higher than the Soviets, but this margin is being reduced.

#### D. Future US-USSR Military Presence

Current US planning does not call for any increase in the present level of military deployments to the Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future. Given current naval force levels, any increase in Indian Ocean activity requires a comparable reduction in naval presence in other areas, particularly in the Pacific where we have only two carriers available on permanent

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deployment. The current expansion of Diego Garcia is primarily intended to provide independent contingency support for US forces in conditions when littoral facilities might be closed to us. However, the facilities on Diego Garcia would be valuable for support of a larger US presence if that were decided at some future date.

Bahrain has reconsidered its request that we terminate our Middle East Force basing arrangement this June, and has agreed in principle to a continued, reduced, presence. We have also begun discussions with the Government of Oman regarding continued air access to the former UK base on Masirah Island; no US personnel would be stationed there, and fueling and over-night billeting would be provided by the Omanis for up to 12 logistic and maritime surveillance flights per quarter. We also maintain a small space tracking facility in the Seychelles.

The best indicator of long-range Soviet military intentions in the Indian Ocean is the construction of support facilities in Somalia, and particularly at Berbera where they have built a large airfield and a cruise missile storage and handling facility which could provide missile support for ships, aircraft and submarines. Of particular concern is the possible future deployment of Soviet missile-armed aircraft in the region. This would represent a significant change in the combat capabilities of the Soviet naval units operating in the area and would be the single development most likely to affect the relative US-USSR military balance in the near future. The future development of Soviet military capabilities in the area will depend heavily on the evolution of their relations with the Somali Government.

#### E. Implications for US and Soviet Regional Interests

The one essential US interest in the Indian Ocean area is to insure continued access to the oil of the Persian Gulf region. The US is also concerned that the states in the area develop economically and politically, free from external pressure. Current US deployments and facilities in the area are intended to serve these purposes by demonstrating US interest in the area, symbolizing support for our Allies and friends and by offsetting the Soviet presence. If Soviet presence should increase, the US would have to seriously consider the military, political, and budgetary costs of increasing military presence in the area or risk the political and economic consequences of permitting a perceived increase in Soviet influence in the area.

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In addition to a general desire to project its presence and influence overseas, the Soviet Union has some particular interests in the Indian Ocean region. Geographically, the nations of the Persian Gulf and Indian Sub-Continent lie immediately to the south of the Soviet border. An important sea route between European Russia and the Soviet Far East lies through the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean. Soviet rivalry with China will continue to be a major factor in Soviet policy toward this area for the foreseeable future. The range of geographical and political interests which have sustained a 20-year courtship of India suggests that the Soviet leadership will continue to devote political, economic, and military resources toward the achievement of their objectives in the region. As the Soviet Navy improves its blue water capabilities, the Soviets may consider the Indian Ocean to be a lucrative area in which to exploit these capabilities for their political purposes, particularly if they sense a US reluctance to meet such a challenge.

US-Soviet arms control arrangements in the Indian Ocean area could serve US interests if it:

- Prevented a US-Soviet military presence competition with the costs this would entail;
- Prevented the introduction of Soviet strike aircraft in the area;
- Reassured our Allies and friends by reducing the possibility of Soviet military predominance in the area;
- Improved the US political image by demonstrating responsiveness to the desires of the littoral states to prevent great power military competition in their area; and
- Possibly if it reduced the military resources which the US would commit to the area.

There are, however, limits on what arms control arrangements could be expected to contribute to stability. Even stringent limits on military and naval forces would have little effect on the Soviet ability to provide support to dissident political movements in Africa or elsewhere in the area. Arms control arrangements based on parity might require the US to surrender some advantages it currently enjoys, such as a politically secure base and the deployment

of carrier forces. The Soviet Union is geographically proximate to the area and, in spite of overflight problems, would be better able to bring air power or air transported forces directly to bear from its own territory. Limits on US force presence in the area would also reduce capabilities for the US to respond to threats not involving the Soviets, such as another Arab blockade in the Red Sea area or evacuation of US citizens. Arms control arrangements in the Indian Ocean might set undesirable precedents for freedom of the seas, for arms control arrangements in ocean areas more vital to US security such as the Mediterranean, and for a Soviet attempt to impose global parity on sea power, an arrangement which would be inconsistent with greater US dependence on seapower to protect its interests and Allies overseas.

In any case, for the US it will be essential to maintain close and continuing consultations with Allies such as Australia and the UK prior to and during the negotiating process. Background discussions with other friendly nations will also be important.

## II. NEGOTIATING ELEMENTS

In analyzing the risks and benefits of an Indian Ocean arms control agreement, an important consideration is what types of military activities might be included and restricted.

### A. General Elements

The Area. The scope of an acceptable definition of the Indian Ocean is limited by customary usage; but a fundamental question is whether bases and forces other than on the coasts of littoral countries should be included and, if so, to what extent.

Types of Forces. We can focus our arms control measures on just maritime forces and facilities, or we can choose the greater risks involved in extending arms control to land-based air and ground forces and inland facilities and activities.

Bilateral versus Multilateral. While we have proposed US/USSR talks, the Soviets might want to argue that the UK and France should also participate or their forces be counted against the US presence.

Verification. Our capability is good, except for submarines. Pre-notification of deployments into and out of the area could aid verification of certain types of ship or aircraft deployment limits.

Nature of Military Presence. Transiting forces should probably not be included in an agreement, because naval operations outside the area would be affected. Transits should be pre-announced and defined by duration and number of allowed port calls.

Crisis Escape Clause. The agreement should contain provisions which would permit deployments to the area in excess of treaty limits under certain extreme contingencies.

#### B. Elements Related to Limitations

Surface Ships. Surface ship deployments could be limited by a variety of means:

-- Surface combatants could be limited.

-- Naval auxiliaries could be included as well. While this limit would not directly control military capability, it could impair Soviet operations because of their greater reliance on auxiliaries. On the other hand, Soviet use of naval associated merchant ships would be unrestricted. For this reason, we may wish to include auxiliaries and merchant ships used to support a naval presence in the area.

-- The duration of deployment could be limited to prevent permanent presence such as the US MIDEASTFOR and to inhibit current Soviet practice of long-term forward deployments.

-- The number of ship-days per year could be limited.

-- The average daily level of ship tonnage (over a year's period) could be limited.

-- Some formula could be derived to value ships according to their tonnage and the resultant figure of merit could be limited.

-9-

Because of the differing character of US and Soviet deployments -- the US deploys fewer, but larger, combatants than the Soviets -- two ceilings appear the simplest and fairest approach: a ceiling on the number of combatants would constrain the Soviets more heavily while a limit on combatant tonnage would constrain the US more heavily.

-- This approach would lower the number of Soviet combatants, but the mix would remain unchanged.

-- The US could send about the same number of ships as at present, but carrier deployments would have to be curtailed; or carriers deployed and the number of ships reduced.

Submarines. Although submarines present certain verification problems, significant, unauthorized deployments of submarines would be difficult to conceal for any period of time. Submarines can either be banned, included in any ship day limitation or excluded from any limits. However, should they be excluded from a ship day limit, the Soviets could increase their submarine presence-- the greatest threat to US naval and merchant activity in the area. The Soviets will be interested in a ban on US SSBNs; but a ban on all submarines would curtail current Soviet practice of deploying one-two general purpose submarines.

Bases (Support Facilities). Again various types of limits are possible:

-- The number of facilities or the type of service performed by facilities under US or Soviet control could be limited or banned.

-- Access to other bases could be limited by, for example, the number and duration of port calls or aircraft visits.

-- Both powers might be barred from making use of facilities for routine maintenance, resupply, or rearmament. (This would not rule out "voyage repairs" necessary for safe transit to the next port of call.) This provision would deny Soviet use of the missile handling and repair facilities in Berbera.

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 UKDIS Geneva  
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 RNLO Diego Garcia

Mr Moberly

ANGLO-US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN: 24-25 MAY

The Americans have sent us a selection of their papers for these talks, of which I attach copies.

2. They have not, however, sent us the paper on Arms Limitation.

E. Clay

E Clay  
Defence Department

20 May 1977

cc

FCO

Mr Mansfield (with all enclosures)  
Mr Wilberforce (with all enclosures)  
Mr Laver, Rhodesia Dept (with copy of paper 8)  
Mr Yarnold (with all enclosures)  
Mr Ibbott, CSAD (with copies of papers 5 and 8)  
Mr Rosling, EAD (with copies of papers 3,4,6,7,9 and 10)  
Mr Field, South Asia Dept (with copy of paper 1)  
Mr Major, MED (with copy of paper 2)  
Mr Clay (with all enclosures)

MOD

(with all enclosures to each)

Mr Whitmore, AUS (Defence Staff)  
Group Captain H Davidson, D of DPS(C)  
Mr Marsh, DS5  
Miss Bennett, DS11

Mr Rundle,  
Cabinet Office, Assessment Staff (with copies of papers 3,5,7,8,9 and 10)

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2



US-UK Indian Ocean Talks - May 1977

Agenda Item VII(b)

Commander Middle East Force: Problems and Prospects

Background Paper

Since 1949 we have maintained Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf region. The flagship has been homeported at the former Royal Navy Jufair Base, where the U.S. Navy has maintained a small logistics and support facility. The flag officer's aircraft has also used facilities in Bahrain, and the Force flagship has been joined by two destroyer type ships rotationally deployed from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Government of Bahrain gave us the year's requisite notice to terminate our stationing agreement. This decision was later reversed, only to be reinstated, and we have been asked to terminate our arrangements in Bahrain by June 30 of this year.

The Bahraini objection to Middle East Force has centered around the argument that they are the only regional government to bear the political burden of hosting a U.S. military presence. To meet this objection, we have suggested a number of changes in Force format.

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-2-

ugh! // We will officially "de-homeport" the Force on June 30, withdraw all of our shore-based personnel and dependents<sup>a</sup> except for approximately 75 Defense Department personnel and their facilities, and reduce our in-port time at Bahrain from more than six months per year to four months per year. In order to provide needed in-port maintenance time for the flagship, which will remain physically in the region, we will request more port visits of longer duration<sup>as opposed to physically?</sup> than normal in other ports, thereby "spreading the political burden" perceived by the Bahrainis.

✓ 1 The Government of Bahrain has agreed in principle to this new format, and we have begun formal negotiations on the details of the new arrangement with the Bahrainis. As these negotiations progress, we will also begin informal discussions with other littoral governments concerning our somewhat more frequent and/or longer port visits.

During our negotiations with Bahrain, we hope to avoid the potential issue of an expanded security assistance relationship. Rather, we will seek to retain our residual presence at Jufair by renting the facilities, thereby continuing the present arrangement.

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NB 063/2

The Hon. I T M Lucas  
MED  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date

17 May 1977

p.a.

Chair

9  
Pity - and  
rather surprising:  
the American, however,  
after all, a new  
four since April  
last year, and  
a lot has  
happened in the  
area.

Dear Sir,

ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

1. Joe Twinam mentioned the other day that Luke Kinsolving had asked him whether the State Department had it in mind to hold a further round of talks with us later in the year.
2. Twinam said that at present he thought this unlikely to be necessary. The talks on the Indian Ocean in London next week would cover the subject adequately; in any case there was not a great deal to add to what had been said in April last year.
3. I said, speaking personally, I was inclined to share this view, but perhaps we should look at the situation again in the Autumn.

Yours ever,

Richard

R J S Muir

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M-Des 0 19.5

Nothing to worry us here - 8/11

The Americans seem to be no

ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN: MAY 1977

REGISTER No 35

19 MAY 1977

AGENDA ITEM VIII: BRIEF NO 13

NB 063/2

ARMS LIMITATION

never on general arms sale  
limitation policy; but we  
ought to keep our eyes on  
these discussions - 18/11

1. US objectives:

- a. To restrain US and Soviet military competition in the Indian Ocean.
- b. To reduce Soviet presence in the region.
- c. To reduce the chances of a super power confrontation.

Line to Take

2. We share the US objectives. We believe a prerequisite for a successful arms limitation agreement would be mutually agreed US and Soviet restraint in the region.
3. We should be interested to know the importance which President Carter attaches to reaching an agreement on this subject.
4. We have studied this question, separately and together, in recent years without finding any realistic formula for solving such problems as comparison of forces; verification, especially of submarines; ships and aircraft in transit; the definition of "bases".
5. We should be interested to know whether US policy has recently been reviewed, especially since the Indian Ocean is the subject for one of the US/USSR working groups to be established as a result of Mr Vance's visit to Moscow.
6. Have the Russians given any indication of their attitude towards serious negotiations on this question?
7. How do the Americans intend to handle United Nations interest in this subject, particularly the recurring Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) Resolutions? The main problems are:
  - a. How best to deal with the request of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean asking "the super powers

/and

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and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean" to participate in preparatory work for an Indian Ocean Conference. In previous years the US, UK, USSR and France have declined the Committee's offer.

- b. If the US intend to be more forthcoming, what extent are they prepared to work for an Indian Ocean Conference?
  - c. Is there any possibility of a more favourable IOPZ Resolution which we could both support?
8. What indications have the Americans received of French reaction to President Carter's initiative?

Background

1. The US undertook to circulate a paper on this subject before the talks were held. The paper has not yet arrived. The US objectives quoted were given to us in April for a possible discussion in the Summit context which did not take place.
2. UK policy is close to that of the US. We think that mutual restraint between the US and USSR would be the best way to approach the problem and have taken this line publicly since early 1975. In answer to a PQ on 9 May, Mr Luard restated the Government's position and welcomed President Carter's initiative. (Annex A refers.)
3. President Carter's position is generally in line with previous US policy, but he has given a new urgency to attempts to engage the Russians in negotiations. His occasional use of the term "complete demilitarisation" would open a novel (and unrealistic) dimension if meant literally. Even mutual military restraint would be very difficult to achieve in any practical and meaningful way. Regular Anglo/US official discussions, and the exchange of written studies, have found no realistic formula. The main problems are:
  - a. Comparison of forces.
  - b. Verification (the most difficult case being submarines).
  - c. Ships and aircraft in transit (including those carrying nuclear weapons).
  - d. The definition of "bases".
4. Although this was a subject remitted to a US/Soviet "working group" during Mr Vance's recent visit to Moscow, neither side appears in any hurry to get this one started on serious discussion.
5. Without the promised US paper it is difficult to know exactly what line the Americans will take. During a visit to Washington on 25 March Mr Peacock, the Australian Foreign Minister, announced publicly that he had been assured by President Carter that he (Carter) had no intention of making a unilateral withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. In 1976 US and UK officials exchanged "non-papers". A summary of the US paper is at Annex B.

/6.

6. The USSR has frequently claimed (as recently as 24 March during President Podgorny's visit to Tanzania) that it is prepared to discuss the problem and "solve it on an equal footing" with the US. (But when Mr Wilson raised the subject in 1975 the Russians only expressed polite interest.) Although he covered all President Carter's other recent references to arms control initiatives, Mr Brezhnev did not mention this one in a speech on 21 March. The Russians have constructed substantial military base facilities at Berbera in Somalia but stubbornly maintain that this is not a "base".

7. Of the outside powers, France has the largest permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean and extensive shore facilities at Djibouti. Publicly France has shown no interest in restraint and is unlikely to welcome any attempt to restrict her activities in the area.

8. It cannot be seriously contended that recent levels of outside military forces have been detrimental to peace and security in the area; it would probably be easier to argue the reverse. However, the concept of restraint by the outside powers has obvious political attractions, not confined to the non-aligned littoral states, some of which nevertheless take comfort from some outside military presence.

United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

9. In 1971, the United Nations passed the first of a series of resolutions calling for the establishment of an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ). All the permanent members of the Security Council (except China) have invariably abstained on IOPZ resolutions, in company with many of their allies, for similar reasons. They believe these resolutions are ill-defined and could prejudice their legitimate interests in the area, in particular freedom of navigation.

10. Since 1972, the UN General Assembly has had an Ad Hoc Committee charged with studying the implications of the proposal to establish

/the

the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The Committee met in New York between 18-22 April and renewed its annual invitation to "the super powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean" to participate in preparatory work for a conference on the Indian Ocean.

11. Initial indications were that the US reply this year would be negative but couched in rather more positive terms. However, the Americans have not yet decided on the form of their reply and these talks provide an opportunity to probe them on this point.

Arms Control and Disarmament Department

17 May 1977

9 May 1977

La Mr Frank Hooley (Sheffield, Heeley): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what progress is being made by the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean which is seeking ways of turning the Indian Ocean into a Zone of Peace; and what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government in this regard.

No W71

MR EVAN LUARD

The United Kingdom is not a member of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. The Committee last met in New York from 18th to 22nd April and intends to meet again from 19th to 23rd of September.

We share the desire of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean for some form of arms limitation in the area. However, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace are ill-defined in scope. In company with over 20 other countries, including the United States, France and the Soviet Union, we have not been able to support them in the form in which they have been presented.

We believe that a successful arms limitation agreement would depend upon mutually agreed restraint by the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. We welcome President Carter's recent initiative which has led to United States/Soviet agreement to establish a joint working group on the Indian Ocean.

## SUMMARY OF US PAPER "THE ROLE OF ARMS LIMITATION IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT"

1. The US paper (May 1976) analysed in detail the existing naval balance in the Indian Ocean and the possible arms control agreements which could be negotiated. It suggested that the most balanced agreement would restrict ship-days and tonnage, thus limiting the Soviet Union which had more ships in the area and the US which sometimes deployed much larger ones there. The paper also suggested that limitations should be placed on the strike aircraft which could be deployed by the two states in the area and on their ground forces to restrict Soviet activities on the littoral.
2. In a final section the paper listed the advantages and disadvantages of seeking an agreement with the Russians. It reached no final conclusions although the majority of arguments listed were against making such an attempt. An extract from the US paper is attached.

*From: The Role of Arms Limitation in the Regional Context*

-- Limit US deployment afloat of ground combat forces.

Conversely, the US specific objectives would probably be to:

-- Prevent the forward basing of Soviet strike aircraft to the region.

-- Reduce or eliminate the potential Soviet submarine threat to US naval forces and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the area.

-- Establish effective limits on the numbers and capabilities of Soviet surface deployments and their supporting infrastructure.

-- Preclude Soviet introduction of ground combat forces into littoral states.

These objectives are not mutually exclusive and in fact provide a potential structure for serious discussions. However, the achievement of these aims in the form of an arms limitation arrangement would be very difficult. In the final analysis, successful negotiation of a comprehensive arrangement balancing these very different objectives would require a careful calculation of costs and benefits and could occur only within a general framework of mutual restraint in which both sides were willing to negotiate in good faith. In the absence of such attitudes on both sides, it is apparent that the asymmetries outlined above provide ample opportunities to sabotage such negotiations or to exploit them for propaganda purposes.

#### Summary of Technical Aspects of Possible Major Provisions for an Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Arrangement

The following summarizes the main provisions that could be considered for inclusion in an Indian Ocean arms control arrangement. Any item could be covered broadly in an informal agreement or defined precisely in a formal treaty. (This summary addresses only the technical aspects of an arrangement and not the broader considerations discussed earlier.)

Limits on Surface Ship Deployments (Combatants and Auxiliaries). This would be the most obvious measure in terms of limiting naval competition. The US might propose:

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• Limits on Total Ship-Days Per Year at the Soviet Level

This would permit the US (but not the Soviets) to substantially increase its current presence (e.g., during crises). For this reason it is probably not negotiable, though it might be a good opening offer.

• Limits on Number of Ships at the Current Soviet Level and on Aggregate Tonnage at the Current US Level

This would be a compromise between the US suggestion of ship-day limits and the probable Soviet preference for tonnage limits. It would have a theoretical symmetrical effect but its practical effect would be to permit the Soviets to increase the size of their ships and the US to increase the number of its ships. Levels could be adjusted upward or downward.

Limits on Submarines. The main reason to exclude submarine limits would be the difficulty of verifying compliance and the desirability of retaining the option to deploy SSBNs in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, limiting or banning submarines would reduce the potential threat to US forces from Soviet attack submarines in exchange for US renunciation of SSBN deployment.

• Include Submarines in the Overall Limits Applied to Surface Ships

Would be almost impossible to verify.

• Ban Submarines

Would be slightly more verifiable in that the detection of even a single Soviet submarine in the area would constitute a violation. Might provide bargaining leverage since Soviets would like to keep US SSBNs out of the Indian Ocean, but would not eliminate the Soviet capability to use attack submarines in a protracted crisis or conflict which resulted in suspension of the arrangement.

Ban Land-Based Strike Aircraft. The absence of strike aircraft support for Soviet naval forces would significantly limit their capabilities vis-a-vis US forces. The Soviets would probably demand a ban on US carrier deployments as the price. Placing some limits on US carrier deployments in exchange for a ban on Soviet strike aircraft might be required in order to provide the basis for a compromise.

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Ban Ground Combat Forces. Would prevent deployment of Soviet ground forces to the area (e. g., such as were deployed to Cuba). Soviets might demand a ban on ground forces afloat as the price. A ban on introduction of ground combat forces into littoral countries and a limit on the deployment of ground combat forces afloat might provide the basis for a compromise.

Ban Construction of Facilities for Use of US-Soviet Naval (and Air) Forces Beyond Those Currently Underway. Would prevent expansion of Soviet facilities beyond the current Berbera construction and would thus eliminate the need for the US to construct additional facilities (e. g., further expansion of Diego Garcia). Might be difficult to agree on what is "currently underway," and the US would certainly want to be able to complete its current program for Diego Garcia.

Ban Use of Facilities in the Area Beyond Current Practices. "Use" would be defined in terms of visits of ships (or aircraft) for more than "x" days and more than "y" visits per year. The only significant current use of indigenous facilities by either side is the US use of Bahrain. If US has to give up Bahrain, this measure could ban any significant use of indigenous facilities by either side (forcing the parties to rely on their permanent facilities at Berbera and Diego Garcia). Would prevent Soviet pressure on littoral nations (e. g., India, Mozambique) for use of their facilities.

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#### IV. PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SEEKING AN ARMS LIMITATION ARRANGEMENT

The principal arguments for and against seeking arms limitation in the Indian Ocean can be summarized as follows:

##### Principal Arguments for Seeking an Arms Limitation Arrangement

An arrangement limiting force levels in the Indian Ocean could provide a potentially effective and economical alternative to matching the expansion of Soviet military capability by a military buildup of our own. If such an arrangement were successful in restricting or preventing the basing of Soviet strike aircraft in the region, and possibly reducing or eliminating the Soviet submarine threat, the capability of Soviet naval forces would be significantly restricted and the probability of direct military confrontation would be reduced or shifted to other areas where US force levels are much stronger. In those circumstances, the US military position in the Indian Ocean would be at least as secure as it is today, even at considerably reduced levels of military presence.

Arms limitation arrangements may be timely. We are considering unilateral reduction in our military presence in the area due to budgetary constraints and competing requirements on our own limited forces, and our MIDEASTFOR facilities in Bahrain may be lost. Should the USSR introduce land-based strike aircraft into the region, the need for a greater US presence would increase if we are to maintain a credible balance with Soviet forces. We now have only two carriers forward deployed to cover the entire Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Moreover, our long-term prospects of competing militarily with the USSR in this region are not bright. The Soviets have demonstrated over more than 20 years their willingness to invest significant political, economic and military capital in the region and may view their interests as more permanent and much more diverse than ours. There are many obstacles to achieving an effective agreement on arms limitations, but the problems may never be smaller or more manageable than they are today, before the USSR completes the development of its facilities in Somalia. We have the opportunity to seize the initiative in seeking an arrangement to preserve the present balance.

A genuine US arms limitation initiative could have tangible benefits even if it ultimately failed. It would attract support in Congress and among the littoral states, and a Soviet rejection would add credibility to

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any subsequent efforts to counter Soviet expansion by a buildup of US forces. It would serve to dramatize long-term Soviet intentions, and would provide an added incentive for regional states to resist Soviet efforts to acquire further base facilities on the littoral.

#### Principal Arguments Against Seeking Arms Limitation Arrangement

From all appearances, the Soviets are not truly interested in arms limitations. Furthermore, the multiple asymmetries of force structure, basing, deployment patterns, and basic interests are such that the Soviets will have ample opportunities to sabotage any such initiative or turn it to their own political and propaganda purposes. Even if the Soviets were genuinely interested in an arrangement, these same asymmetries would make it difficult to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both sides. In order to arrive at any mutually acceptable arrangement, we would have to be willing to make significant concessions in those areas where we have some advantage today, i.e., carrier forces and politically secure support facilities. Under some arrangements involving particularly limits on bases, we might also have to be willing to see changes in some of our bilateral political arrangements in the area. The effect of these concessions might be to put the US at a disadvantage since the USSR is geographically proximate to the area and, in spite of overflight problems, might be better able to bring some air power or air transported forces directly to bear from its own territory. Moreover, any arrangement limiting US and Soviet military forces and facilities would provide little effective control on those areas of activity, e.g., covert support of dissident movements, military aid to expansionist regimes, use of surrogate forces, and other forms of disguised intervention, which pose more of a threat to regional stability. Rather, an arms limitation arrangement might actually assist the Soviets in these efforts by providing apparent "proof" of Soviet claims that it seeks no dominant position in the Indian Ocean area -- while placing little constraint on Soviet ability to pursue covert actions. A US willingness to engage in such an arrangement would cause increased skepticism about our ability to reach viable agreements with the Soviets that protect US interests.

Most of the potential threats to US interests in the region are essentially political and unrelated to the Soviet military presence -- as was the oil boycott of 1973-74. The only previous blockade in the area was conducted by Egyptian, not Soviet, forces. Yet an agreement which

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established stringent limitations on US force deployments to the area would sharply curtail our flexibility to respond to such situations in the future.

Any formal arrangement which established limitations on naval activities on the basis of some form of parity could be an undesirable precedent for US interests in maintaining the basic high seas freedoms, and could complicate the on-going Law of the Sea negotiations. An Indian Ocean arms limitation arrangement could be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the Peace Zone proposal, thus lending credence to the concept that littoral states have the right to establish restrictions on adjacent areas of the high seas. It would encourage the USSR to press for similar restrictions in the Mediterranean, where our interests are much greater. It could establish the precedent for a Soviet attempt to impose global "parity" on the two navies, a principle inconsistent with the greater US dependence on seapower to protect its interests and allies overseas. And it could be viewed as a lessening of US interest in the area and an inability to match the Soviet presence.

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Reference

*in Day - I have no NED problems - do you?*

*T Radcliffe*

*17.5*

Mr Radcliffe

MED

Mr Wheeler

NENAD

Mr Bone

EESD

Separate copies

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19 MAY 1977

NB 063/2

ANGLO-US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, 24-25 MAY:  
THE HORN OF AFRICA

1. I attach a brief for this meeting on  
which I should welcome your comments by  
2 pm Tuesday 17 May. Apologies for the  
short notice.

*Robert Johnson*

17 May 1977

R J Johnson (Mrs)  
East African Department

*in pigeon box*

*Amendments, please READ  
this copy for your attention*

*T Radcliffe*

*17.5*

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*Mr Radcliffe - 2 copies please.*

*A bit nervous from our  
point of view what about  
the issue of peace idea?  
i.e. our note to ADD*

*and anything gleaned  
by Dr. Jones 3399  
17.5*

CODE

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Telephone No. Ext.

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ANGLO-US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN 24-25 MAY 1977

ITEM NO. II BRIEF NO. 2

THE HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia

1. Colonel Mengistu seems firmly in control of the government, although problems continue to mount on virtually all fronts. Ethiopia is becoming aligned evermore closely with the Soviet Union, as witnessed by Mengistu's recent visit to Moscow, and it seems certain that he is expecting Soviet arms supplies to replace those from ~~Western~~ (primarily American) sources. His stop in Tripoli on the way back from Moscow suggests that the Russians may hope to continue to supply arms to Ethiopia through other governments (Libya and PDRY) in order to minimise Somali reaction. We should be interested in American views on the effects on the capability of the Ethiopian army of the transition from ~~American~~ ~~Western~~ to Russian arms and training.

2. There is a high level of insurgency in most Ethiopian provinces. <sup>g</sup> The liberation movements continue to make gains In Eritrea by picking off small towns and army outposts held by the Ethiopian Government, but they still lack the military capability to expel the Ethiopians from the main towns. The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) have gained some success in north-eastern areas bordering the Sudan; but they have had Sudanese help <sup>there</sup> and it is ~~doubtful~~ <sup>open to</sup> whether they could maintain such successes further into Ethiopian territory.

3. The Ethiopian Government is planning another large assault on dissidents in the north, using ~~new divisions~~ <sup>peasant</sup> militias which may be trained partially by Cubans (although we have

/no

newly raised  
& formations  
and

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no definite information on that score). It appears that their first objective will probably be to crush the EDU, and they may then turn to Eritrea. The dismal failure of the peasant march last year augurs ill for this venture, <sup>although</sup> ~~but~~ the Ethiopians may have learnt some lessons from it. It seems ~~possible that they may regain territory held by the EDU and force the latter to retreat across the Sudanese border; however the Eritreans might be a different proposition.~~ <sup>towards</sup>

Whether <sup>use</sup> new divisions will significantly improve the capabilities of the Ethiopian armed forces.

### Somalia

4. The Somalis are clearly alarmed at growing Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and this has caused them to increase their contacts with Arab states and to make overtures to Western governments. However, there is no sign ~~as~~ at present of any serious estrangement between Somalia and the USSR, and the Somalis will need to tread warily in view of their dependence on Soviet arms supplies. Even if the Somalis are serious in wishing to reduce their dependence on the Soviet Union generally, they could not afford a sudden breach and therefore could only be expected to move away from the Russians gradually. The question of an alternative arms supplier might well be crucial to any <sup>such</sup> ~~real~~ move by the Somalis away from the Soviet Union and <sup>it</sup> ~~would~~ <sup>be difficult</sup> ~~probably cause~~ <sup>step into the breach</sup> ~~problems to any Western government in view of~~ Somalia's territorial claims on her neighbours.

(The visit of our Minister of State)

5. (Mr Rowlands' ~~visit~~ to Somalia, 22-25 May, is intended partly to explore the fluidity of the situation in the area, although the main objective is to provide a basis for improving our bilateral relations and investing them with more <sup>substance</sup> ~~content~~. However a Somali request for arms would obviously pose problems in view of our involvement with Kenya.

6. We should be interested in American views on Somalia and in particular on the arms supplies question. <sup>As they have no evidence that the Somalis will</sup>

offer to finance  
equipment of the  
armed forces, as they  
did in 1972.

French Territory of the Afars and Issas

7. Following a referendum and elections on May 8, independence is scheduled for 27 June. The Territory's prospects remain uncertain, but they are perhaps better than they were a few months ago. Economic aid is promised from France and, so far as we know, <sup>for</sup> the Saudis, and the Territory intends to join the Arab League and the OAU soon after independence. If so requested by the government of the newly independent state The French are ready to leave a military presence for a year or two to help guarantee the Territory's independence. Many of the Territory's leaders seem to maintain links with Somalia, and Ethiopia is now seen as the main threat, although hampered by her own internal weaknesses.

8. Economically the Territory would almost certainly be better off by remaining independent and continuing to draw revenue from the rail-road link with Ethiopia as well as the inflows of foreign aid. This may well influence the Government to pursue <sup>(course of)</sup> genuine independence from either of its neighbours. However it seems <sup>un-</sup>likely that <sup>no</sup> local political leaders will ~~not~~ be able to maintain a facade of unity for long, which could give opportunities for meddling by both Ethiopia and Somalia, who remain intensely suspicious of one another.

Activities of Arab States in the Area

9. The Egyptians, Sudanese ~~and~~ Saudis <sup>and Y. etc</sup> have all expressed to us concern about instability in the Horn of Africa and the spread of Soviet influence there. The Saudis are taking the lead in efforts to wean the Somalis away from the Soviet Union with promises of aid, a policy they are also pursuing with the PDRY.

10. We see advantage in continuing to keep in touch with the moderate Arabs on this subject and <sup>cooperating</sup> encouraging them, insofar as possible, in their efforts to counter Russian influence. <sup>Dr. Owen's, linkage with Saudis</sup> ... / Soviet

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*Re Saudis confirmed to Owen that they were concerned about recent action in Ethiopia. Said that he was not sure if he was supposed to be involved in this matter.*

*\* [then we need an emergency - it's their idea not ours.]*

Soviet Objectives

11. Until a few weeks ago we tended to think that the Russians would value their military facilities in Somalia too much to risk jeopardising them by heavy involvement with Somalia's chief enemy, Ethiopia, particularly in view of the instability of the Ethiopian regime. We can no longer be sure of this as a result of recent developments. It would seem that the Russians regard Ethiopia as a prize worth running risks for, presumably in view of the large population, greater economic resources and better prospects which it may offer for ideological penetration, <sup>in comparison with Somalia,</sup> It may be also that the Russians consider that their hold on Somalia is now such that the Somalis have little choice but to accept Soviet involvement in Ethiopia. It is probable that the Russians hope that it will never be necessary for them to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia; to this end their policy must be to try to limit the possibilities of conflict between the two - hence, no doubt, the plans for some form of federation between the two neighbours and Djibouti that have surfaced from time to time without apparently meeting with approval from <sup>the</sup> ~~these~~ states concerned. How do the Americans see <sup>Soviet</sup> ~~Russian~~ policy in the area?

British Policy

12. We recently reviewed our policy in the Horn of Africa. The following are the main conclusions which were reached as a result:

- a. We should continue our general close relations with, and support for, Kenya and the Sudan.
- b. We should try to maintain our presence in Ethiopia in order to protect our remaining interests and to present an alternative to the communist countries, in the hope that the

/situation

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situation might improve.

c. We should try to improve relations with Somalia.

d. We should establish some contact with the Djibouti Government <sup>after</sup> ~~of post~~ independence. This will probably be an Honorary Consulate, with diplomatic accreditation, from a nearby post (possibly Sana'a).

13. Our policy review also underlined the importance of continuing consultation with the Americans and our colleagues within the European Community.

14. Mr Vance told us some weeks ago that the State Department were reviewing American policy in the Horn of Africa area also. We should be interested to know if they have completed this review now.

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19 MAY 1977

Reference.....

RK  
(8)

Mr Rundle, Assessments Staff  
Mr Rosling, EAD  
Mr Field, SAD  
Mr Reith, CSAD  
Mr Harrison, Rhodesia Dept  
Mr Burns, ACDD  
Mr Figgis, EESD  
Mr Norbury, DS11 MOD  
Mr Moss, DS5 MOD  
Mr Holton, DS8 MOD  
Gp Capt H Davidson, DPS(C) MOD

NS 063/2

Mr James 5/5

05.5  
in Day OK.

Relin 4 Bort 19/5

✓ 4/5

MED is not asked  
for anything.

11am are interested

in the Indian Ocean &  
the discuss with

Def Dept the  
possibility of reflecting  
this somewhere.

cc: for information  
Mr Moberly  
Mr Wilberforce  
Planning Staff  
NAD  
PUSD  
MED ✓  
SEAD  
SWPD  
WED

The Major Brief being copied to  
We have a particular interest in the

shared items - grateful if you would  
keep an eye to see our interests  
are protected.

2  
5/5

ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE INDIA OCEAN: 24/25 MAY 1977

The next round of these six-monthly talks will take place in London on 24.5 and 25 May. Mr L Gelb, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, will lead for the Americans and Mr Moberly for us. I attach a copy of the agreed Agenda showing which side is to lead on each item plus a list of the briefs required. Against each of the latter I have named the Departments who should, I suggest, be responsible for preparing it - where more than one Department is named, the first should please co-ordinate the brief.

2. I should be grateful if 15 copies of each brief in final form on plain white A4 paper could reach Mr Clay in this Department by close of play on Tuesday 17 May, having been cleared as necessary with Defence and other Departments, and with the Ministry of Defence. Each brief should be headed "Anglo/US Talks on the Indian Ocean: May 1977" and should show the number of the relevant Agenda item and of the brief. They should be in a form suitable for verbatim quotation: any background information which may not be passed to the Americans should be in a separate annex.

3. Mr Moberly will no doubt wish to hold a briefing meeting shortly before the talks; subject to the procedure agreed then for handling the talks, I should be grateful if action addressees would be prepared to attend the session of concern to them and to be ready to lead the discussion on the particular items for which they have produced a brief. The talks will be held in the India Office Council Chamber. They will begin at 10.00 in the morning of 24 May, and there will be a break for lunch from about 1300-1500. We expect to complete discussions of all items except the last on 24 May, leaving 25 May for Arms Limitation.

E. Clay

P.P. P Yarnold  
Defence Department

3 May 1977

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AGENDA

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Brief No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>US/UK to Lead</u>	<u>Brief By</u>
-	-	Steering Brief		Defence Dept
I	1	Soviet Presence	US	Assessments Staff
II	2	Horn of Africa	UK	EAD *
III		East Africa and the Indian Ocean Islands	UK	
	3	Kenya/Tanzania/Uganda		EAD
	4	Mauritius, the Seychelles, Maldives		EAD/SAD
IV	5	Strategic Effects of Developments in Southern Africa	US	CSAD/Rhodesia Dept EESD/Assessments Staff
V	6	India's Strategic Interest In the Indian Ocean	US	SAD
VI		Western Military Activity	US	
	7	Diego Garcia Progress Report		Defence Dept/EAD
	8	COMIDEASTFOR		DS5 *
		US Naval Activity in the Indian Ocean		No brief required
	9	RN Deployments in the Indian Ocean	UK	DS5
	10	Deployments and Activities of Other Allies		DS5
VII		Other		
	11	Overflights	US	Defence Dept/DS8
	12	Singapore Naval Facilities	UK	Defence Dept/DS5
VIII	13	Arms Limitation	US	ACDD *

Mr. Day 18.5  
Mr. Gallagher 18.5  
1815  
in view of recent  
I.H.T. news I have been  
will any one  
No line to take - e.g.  
about future of the Bahrain base

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Mr. Major, MED

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As requested EC 17/5

ITEM NO VI: BRIEF NO 8

ANGLO-US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN: MAY 1977


COMIDEASTFOR

NB 063/2

1. Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) was established on 1 Jan 49 and is the only permanently assigned US Naval Force in the Indian Ocean area. Base facilities are maintained at Jufair, Bahrain. The operational area includes the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and, under the recently implemented Unified Command Plan, the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Malacca.
2. MIDEASTFOR normally comprises 3 ships; the permanently assigned flagship (USS LA SALLE) and 2 rotating Atlantic Fleet destroyers or frigates. While assigned to MIDEASTFOR the latter are away from their home port without repair or upkeep services for about 6 months. There is only one assigned aircraft.
3. COMIDEASTFOR's tasks include:
  - a. Port visits to littoral states.
  - b. Collection of intelligence to support the Force Commander and to satisfy theatre and national authorities. This includes the conduct of both surveillance and special intelligence operations throughout the area. With extremely limited assets MIDEASTFOR has been most successful in SIGINT collection against both littoral countries and the Soviet Navy.

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- c. On-the-job training for both US personnel and members of certain Arab forces, including the Saudi, Omani and Abu Dhabi navies.
- d. Liaison with US Diplomatic representatives, British and French authorities and with Government and Armed Services of friendly and neutral nations.
- e. The conduct of national and multi-national training exercises.
- f. To plan, conduct and co-ordinate US national offensive and defensive anti-submarine operations.
- g. Responsibility for search and rescue operations.
- h. Co-ordinating and arranging for the logistical support of units assigned to MIDEASTFOR.



Mr Clay, Defence Department

ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (2)

MED has no comments on the draft agenda circulated with your minute of 15 February other than to express relief that the Gulf area has been omitted. However, it might be worth adding a warning note in your letter to Washington to keep Masirah firmly off the talking points. You might like to say something on the following lines:-

"We hope the Americans will not seek to discuss Masirah as we shall by then have left. We suggested to them last year that they should discuss their own future requirements directly with the Omanis. Not unnaturally, their advance planning has been in suspense but we heard recently from the US Embassy in London that the papers had been dusted off and would be put soon to the new Secretary of State. There may be one or two points of detail to be cleared up between us and the Americans and we have suggested that these be dealt with in London".

P.A.  
23 February 1977

B A Major  
Middle East Department

(3)

Reference

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21 FEB 1977  
063/2

In. Hysor.

Done

fl 23/2

It might be worth a morning note -  
the draft letter about Namibia -

"We have the Americans will not seek  
to discuss Namibia as the matter will be  
~~done~~ we shall by then have left. We  
suggested to ten last year that they should  
discuss their own future requirements, with  
the Danes. Direct Not unreasonably, their  
advance planning has been in response but  
we heard recently from the State US  
Embassy - London that the planning papers <sup>had been</sup>  
~~are being updated~~ dusted off and the  
would be put soon to the new Secretary of  
State. There may be one or two points of  
detail to be cleared up between us and the  
Americans <sup>at</sup> but we have suggested that there  
be handled dealt with in London."

*[Signature]*

(2)

Mr Carter  
East Africa Department



ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN

The next of these regular six monthly consultations is due to take place in London on 24 and 25 May. It is for us to suggest an Agenda to the Americans, and I attach a draft letter proposing one.

2. I should be grateful for your comments, and those of other recipients of copies of this minute, on the attached draft Agenda and for any suggestions you may have for deletions or additions to the list of subjects for discussion. Could I please have responses by 24 February.

*E. Clay*

E Clay  
Defence Department

*Separate minute*

*pa. 23/1*

15 February 1977

cc (with enc) to:

Mr Hunt, EAD	Mr White, EUSD
Mrs Johnson, EAD	Mr Yarnold
Mr Brown, ACDD	Mr Hime, SWPD
Mr Denison-Edson, CSAD	Mr Cook, SWPD
Mr Flynn, CSAD	
Mr Hurr, Rhodesia Dept	
Mr Hum, SAD	
Mr Fursland, SAD	
Mr Woodfield, SAD	
Mr Major, MED	
Miss Darling, NAD	
Gp Capt H Davidson	
AD of DP(C), MOD	
Miss Bennett, DS 11, MOD	
Mr Knight, DS5, MOD	
Mr Rundle, Assessments Staff	
cc for information to:	
Mr Bone, EESD	
Mr Wong, SEAD	

①

Registry  
No.

DRAFT

LETTER

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret,  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:-

J P Millington Esq. MVO  
WASHINGTON

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23 FEB 1977  
NB 063/2

From

P Yarnold

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

ANGLO/US TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN: 24 AND 25 MAY

Please would you refer to your telno 512 reporting Churchill's interest in receiving a proposed draft Agenda for these talks. We suggest that <sup>it</sup>~~they~~ should be along the lines indicated in paragraph 2 below subject, of course, to any proposals the Americans themselves may have.

2. We expect the talks to finish at the latest by lunch-time on 25 May, but an earlier conclusion seems quite likely. We propose the following items for discussion:-

- I Soviet Presence.
- II Horn of Africa -
  - (a) Somalia
  - (b) Ethiopia
  - (c) Prospects for the FTAI
- III East Africa -
  - (a) Kenya/Tanzania/Uganda
  - (b) Mauritius, the Seychelles
- IV Developments in Southern Africa.
- V South Asia -
  - (a) India after the elections
  - (b) Pakistan and Sri Lanka
- VI Arms Limitations (as Churchill's remarks - reported in telno 512 - imply, we shall be very interested to hear how the thinking of the new Administration is developing on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean).

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I US/UK Military Activity -

- (a) Diego Garcia progress report
- (b) COMIDEASTFOR: progress and prospects in negotiations with the Bahranis.
- (c) US Naval activity in the Indian Ocean.
- (d) RN deployments in the Indian Ocean.

VIII Other -

- (a) Overflights (we should be interested to know the results of any study the US may have undertaken following discussion of this subject at the last talks - see paragraph 17 of the ~~of discussion on~~ record ~~for~~ 27 October 1976).
- (b) Naval Control of Shipping in the Middle East, Sub-Area (at the last talks - see paragraph 25 of the record - the Americans agreed that they would examine the question of taking on the task of Regional Co-ordinator for the Middle East area).
- (c) General policy on Naval Control of Shipping Exercises (the most recent exercise mounted under the Radford-Collins agreement - Exercise Roller Coaster - was held in March. It involved the activation of British Naval Control of Shipping Officers (NCSOs) in Singapore and Jakarta, while <sup>earlier</sup> plans for their participation in Kuwait and Karachi were dropped. We should like to discuss <sup>with</sup> the Americans how closely the State Department are consulted by the US Navy about the planning of these exercises, when US Embassies are involved and when the exercise includes activation of NCS personnel in politically <sup>/sensitive</sup>

sensitive third countries).

- (d) [Singapore Naval Facilities - if we have progress to report (on this subject) in our negotiations with the Singaporeans].

3. We look forward to hearing the Americans' comments on this proposed Agenda.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN